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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE fifth amendment to our federal Constitution provides that
.L"No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." 1 Since 1791 this has been
a vital part of our federal constitutional structure and value sys-
tem. The first recited clause is commonly called the due process
clause; the second goes by many names, including the just com-
pensation clause, the eminent domain clause and the takings
clause.2 The simple wording has generated centuries of debate
and volumes of esteemed analyses. What do these simple phrases
mean-particularly the twelve words of the takings clause? What
are their underlying constitutional principles? Are their current
interpretations consistent with those principles? And what role
have political considerations played in their doctrinal
development?
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Most state constitutions contain their own due process and just compensation
clauses. North Carolina is the only state without a constitutional just compensation provi-
sion, but its courts have read their state due process clause to require comparable results. 1
J. SACKMAN, P. Nicsois' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3 (rev. 3d ed., 1980 & Supp.
1984) [hereinafter cited as NIcHoLs].
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A. Relationship Between the Due Process Clause and the Takings
Clause
Both the due process clause and the takings clause overtly re-
fer to property. The due process clause guarantees that property
will not be irrationally, arbitrarily or capriciously taken by govern-
ment action.3 It requires the government to act with a public pur-
pose for the public good,' to treat similarly situated people
equally, and to employ fair procedures before it candeprive any
citizen of property, or for that matter, life or liberty. Procedural
fairness is only 6ne facet of due process. Investigations into the
full contours of the due process fairness requirement have filled
tomes of case reporters, scholarly law reviews, encyclopedic com-
pilations and treatises. Opinions about its meaning vary greatly.
Many eminent jurisprudents attach a substantive component
to due process. Even if not specifically articulated, courts often
evaluate constitutional questions with an eye toward substantive
due process or fundamental fairness.5 Whether a court is deter-
3. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
4. Our state and federal governments' powers are inherently, as well as constitution-
ally, limited by our country's fundamental republican themes and respect for individual
autonomy. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55-93,
175-98 (1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBmau 1776-1787 (1969). The
Supreme Court has consistently indicated that police power exercises, taxation and takings
are restricted to public purposes because of our governmental structure and due process.
For example, Justice Miller explained in Loan Association v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 655, 662-65 (1874), that a state could only use its police and taxation powers to
enhance the general welfare. Justice Harlan wrote in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661
(1887), that police power regulations that did not have a "real or substantial relation" to
public safety, morals or health and that caused a "palpable invasion of rights" were invalid
exercises of legislative power. For a further discussion of Mugler see infra notes 112-15 and
accompanying text. In Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896), Justice
Gray wrote for the unanimous Court that a taking for a private purpose violated due pro-
cess regardless of whether the government attempted to pay compensation. Justice Bren-
nan, in his plurality dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 656 (1981), stated the now familiar rule that police power regulations had to be sub-
stantially related to the advancement of the public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare, and that it was axiomatic that the public was to benefit from them.
Professor Laurence Tribe summarized the early understandings about the due process
public purpose requirement. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTUnONAL LAw § 9-2 at 457 (1978).
He stated: "[N]o form of legislative authority could be employed to serve private ends:
taking, taxing, and regulation were all inherently linked to the public good and depended
for their legitimacy upon the preservation of that link." Id. (footnote omitted).
5. Courts have engaged in semantic and legal contortions to avoid charges that they
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mining if an unenumerated right is so fundamental that our con-
were applying substantive due process standards to reach desired results. Judicial interfer-
ence with social and economic legislation under the rubric of "substantive due process"
became an anathema with the demise of the Lochner era. Despite the fundamental differ-
ence between the Supreme Court's actions during the Lochner era when it invalidated pro-
gressive economic and social legislation (by making political decisions) and what a court
does when making fairness determinations as an inherent part of judging whether legisla-
tion accords with due process (by making principled decisions), these two phenomena have
been confused. For a further discussion of Lochner, see infra note 118.
So long as both judicial processes bear the same label, judges will feel compelled to
perform multi-veiled dances that permit them to sidestep cries of substantive due process
while still finding constitutional hooks on which to hang decisions informed by either fun-
damental fairness or "political" considerations. (By "political" I mean decisions which are
determined by dominant power relationships of groups, classes or individuals.) The resul-
tant confusion is formidable. Because it has become taboo to justify a result on the basis of
the substantive due process requirements of fundamental fairness, judges feel they must
disguise what they are doing by manipulating other doctrines about which it is acceptable
to write. The success of this technique has also resulted in its use by judges who are basing
their decisions on the equally taboo political considerations of power relationships, primar-
ily defined by wealth. Reasonably clear constitutional doctrines become unrecognizable
forms in the process. All this occurs in order to legitimate particular results in particular
cases. The newly sculpted rules are like unchecked viruses that continue to grow, infecting
larger and larger portions of the doctrine's corpus. Eventually they can be used to justify
results and support rationales that their original authors would find objectionable. The
trouble that this peculiar rationalizing technique causes students of law pales against the
more serious ramifications of having severely distorted constitutional doctrine to delimit
the rights and interests of our national citizens, particularly, for my purposes here, in the
takings clause area.
After a time, the principles inherent in and protected by specific constitutional provi-
sions are buried in the sediment of other justifications (possibly to disguise fairness determi-
nations, but even more disconcertingly, I would argue, to reach politically expedient re-
sults). It often takes legal archaeologists to unearth the shards and attempt to reassemble
them. Whether this is a meritorious quest is a value judgment I leave to my readers. It is
arguable that the new renditions of constitutional provisions more appropriately reflect the
advances of civilization (after all, as Chief Justice Marshall admonished in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819): "[W]e must never forget, that it is a consti-
tution we are expounding"), but it is also possible that they flow from the finely honed skills
of the dominant classes in manipulating our legal and political systems to their own ends.
The characteristic flexibility and adaptability of our Constitution is as much a trap as an
asset. If its language remains too obscure, malleable or undefined, it can become all-con-
suming, embracing most ideas at most times. Through its apparently stable form can pass
results based on very contradictory principles, values and policies. Politically powerful
groups can legitimatize many means to their private ends in the language of one or another
constitutional clause. It is hard to imagine that our Constitution is supposed to mean all
things to all people. Certainly it must have core principles and values that infuse its words
and limit its applicability, no matter how eloquent are the words of the orators for the
powerful private interests.
I find it ironic that our Constitution derives its great stability, not from its semantic
flexibility to promote its core principles during changing times, but from its malleable lan-
guage's apparent ability to reinforce and maintain the extant power structure. So long as
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stitutional order protects it," or that certain procedures are im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,7 or that others do not
comport with due process because they "shock the conscience,",
notions of substantive due process pervade the reasoning.
It is my considered belief that substantive due process princi-
ples of fairness are completely appropriate considerations for
courts, whereas political decisions designed to perpetuate current
patterns of domination inconsistent with the spirit of our national
unity are not. The definition of substantive due process should be
confined to fundamental fairness judgments. Power-reinforcing
considerations should be excised from the concept so that it may
again be used without opprobrium. If judges had the freedom to
frame their rulings in the language of fundamental fairness/sub-
stantive due process, they would not be compelled to further dis-
tort other constitutional principles to achieve substantively fair re-
sults. Counterintuitive twists of doctrine would then be more apt
to occur only in cases of political decisions; they would be immedi-
ately suspect, and harder to justify. If the development of legal
doctrines requires ruse to effectuate our law's inherent principle
of fairness, courts will use ruse to implement their decisions. If
judges are encouraged to openly articulate the role substantive
fairness plays in their decision-making process, manipulation and
distortion will be greatly reduced.
The takings clause's physical intimacy with the due process
clause,9 as well as its simultaneous regulation of state behavior re-
specting private property, frequently cause its provisions to be
the politically powerful can manipulate its words and shape its meanings to suit their gen-
eral needs (while being cautious not to upset the oppressed or disadvantaged enough that
they are moved to revolution), they will permit it to exist in its current form. Their pri-
mary objectives are to maintain their political and economic power and perpetuate the
dominant ideologies. It may be that, despite its original purposes (or perhaps because of
them, see infra note 21 and accompanying text), our Constitution has served to undermine
its own founding ideals. But that is a theme for another essay.
6. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
7. Justice Cardozo used this language in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), to describe what was substantively in-
cluded in the due process clause.
8. Justice Frankfurter explained in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952),
that the due process clause requires states to "respect decencies of civilized conduct" and
not use methods that offend "a sense of justice."
9. Both are part of the same amendment, US. CoNsT. amend. V.
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confused with notions of due process. While at first blush this may
sound inoffensive, it has disturbing results, particularly in regard
to permissible governmental activities, the standard of review of
legislative enactments, and remedies for unconstitutional action.
The takings clause's "public use" limitation-"nor shall private
property be taken for public use"-is confused with the due pro-
cess requirement that legislation must have a public purpose or
benefit. In addition, the limitations on judicial review of legislative
ends and means that developed as a reaction to Lochnerian politi-
cal decisionmaking in the name of substantive due process have
been incorporated into the takings clause. Courts have been virtu-
ally forbidden from evaluating whether a legislatively sanctioned
taking is for a public use, 10 even though judicial assessment of leg-
islative ends may be a constitutionally justifiable check on govern-
mental takings of private property, if viewed through a takings
clause lens. If the substantive due process standard of review is
applied to takings analyses, the judiciary is powerless to undo leg-
islation that literally takes one person's property for the benefit of
another who has more political power. Finally, remedies for viola-
tions of due process can, and arguably should, differ from reme-
dies for unconstitutional takings. Remedial distinctions are mean-
ingless if the clauses are confused.
When the two clauses are read to have identical requirements
with respect to the treatment of private property, the takings
clause becomes superfluous: takings and deprivations of property
become synonymous; police power regulations of property use are
equated with transfers of property to the government. Surely the
framers would not have scrivened a totally superfluous provision
into the bill of rights. Therefore, one goal of a takings clause stu-
dent must be to distinguish between the requirements of due pro-
cess and those inherent in the takings clause-that is, between
deprivations and takings, and between public purpose and public
use. Additionally, efforts must be made to discern the principles,
policies and politics underlying these distinct provisions.
10. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238-39, 243-45 (1984); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-34 (1954).
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B. Relationship Between Takings and Deprivations
Life, liberty and property are protected by our constitutional
scheme. They are ours by right, and they can never constitution-
ally be denied for someone else's private pleasure or personal use.
There are times, however, when the government may constitu-
tionally require us to contribute parts of those rights to the com-
mon good. Those occasions are as strictly controlled as possible by
the due process clause. If the government, consisting of our repre-
sentatives, determines that it is in the public interest to deprive us
of any fundamental right, it must follow the procedures pre-
scribed by those representatives. The procedures must be more
than reflective of the representative body's will; they must be fun-
damentally fair.
The due process clause also requires that the government
have a public purpose before it may attempt to deprive us of life,
liberty or property. The Constitution does not explicitly allow pri-
vate interests to exert pressure on legislatures to enact laws bene-
fitting those lobbyists' personal interests at the expense of other
citizens' private rights.11 If that untoward event occurs, a constitu-
tional check gives courts (if the principle of judicial review is ac-
cepted as constitutionally required)12 power to nullify the result as
contravening constitutional standards. This check applies to legis-
lation that effects deprivations of life, liberty or property. Prop-
erty is specifically mentioned. Therefore, even absent the takings
clause, the government would be constitutionally prohibited from
depriving citizens of their property for private purposes or by un-
fair means. Working from the premise that the takings clause was
not intended to be superfluous, I conclude that it must refer to a
situation different from a deprivation of property without substan-
tive or procedural due process.13
11. That it happens in reality is evidence of the dichotomy between constitutional the-
ory and political practice that infests much of our constitutional jurisprudence. The beauti-
fully woven constitutional cloak provided by our foreparents has become threadbare in
some sections. We rely on its protections, but the bitter winds of time have aged it badly.
12. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. This analysis creates an immediate problem related to the meaning and use of
words in legal discourse. Is it realistic or appropriate to try to distinguish between "depri-
vations" and "takings"? Does it matter that the due process clause speaks of "deprivations"
of property and the takings clause refers to property being "taken"? Is this a meaningless
semantic debate? Or is it a throwback to the discredited formalistic style of legal analysis? I
think not, but even if it is, it still seems vitally important to an understanding of the two
1985]
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If takings and deprivations were identical for purposes of
these two clauses, then it would appear that the framers of our
Constitution intended to privilege property rights over personal
rights to life and liberty.1 4 This seems a necessary and logical con-
clusion from the fact that over and above protections against dep-
rivations without due process, property-and property alone-is
singled out in the takings clause. Even when due process is af-
forded and the government has acted reasonably, fairly and for a
legitimate public purpose, its taking of private property is limited
to public uses with just compensation. 5 Life, liberty and property
clauses.
Formalism, as a school of jurisprudential analysis, has gone by the wayside. Few, if any,
current legal scholars would call themselves formalists. The nomenclature bears negative
connotations in legal circles. Perhaps notions of formalism need to be revised. Systematic
constitutional distortions may require the reintroduction of a sophisticated, higher order
formalism, in which words and phrases again have ostensibly stable meanings without un-
necessarily rigidifying legal systems, policy choices, principles and values. This tentative call
for a new species of formalism in constitutional jurisprudence may be no more than a tran-
sient overreaction to my current, heartfelt sense about the politically malleable, content-
free character of constitutional protections. [For the purposes of this footnote, I am brack-
eting the debates about the meanings of words and texts generally.].
14. I acknowledge that there are serious debates about whether it should even matter
what the framers "intended" when they wrote the fifth amendment, or what those who
ratified it thought it meant. See generally Symposium, Judicial Review and the Constitu-
tion-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 443 (1983), for discussions of varied ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation. The battle between historical reconstruction and
rational reconstruction, or interpretivist and noninterpretivist methodologies, rages on.
Adherents to the school of historical reconstruction argue that we must interpret and un-
derstand documents by relying on what the writers intended in their historical perspec-
tives. Rational reconstructionists find meaning in documents by studying them in light of
current understandings. Because both schools start from such different premises, they can-
not effectively argue with each other. It does not seem improper or inconsistent to me to
select an interpretive strategy that blends the insights and intentions of historical drafters
with contemporary understandings and the cumulative wisdom of the day.
15. The takings clause actually states that private property may not be taken for pub-
lic use without just compensation. It does not declare that private property may not be
taken for private use in so many words. However, it would be nonsensical to read that
clause to permit the state to take private property for private use without just compensa-
tion, but require it to pay just compensation if it takes private property for public use.
Therefore, it has been consistently agreed that the negative implication of the public use
phraseology in the eminent domain clause is that the government has no constitutional
power to take private property for private use. See, e.g., 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, §
7.01[2]; Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 205
(1978); Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV.
351, 365; Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 409, 410 (1983) (I have intentionally listed student authors' names with
their works throughout the footnotes because I believe they deserve the same respect as
other legal scholars when their works are cited). In any case, the due process clause, which
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are each protected against deprivations, yet if deprivations are ac-
corded the same meaning as takings only deprivations of property
would constitutionally require just compensation. Could the draft-
ers have meant, by negative implication, that deprivations of life
or liberty do not require just compensation, but deprivations of
property do? No matter how great their regard for private prop-
erty rights, it is difficult to imagine that the Constitution's authors
revered and valued their right to protect their property from un-
compensated government infringement over their same rights in
life and liberty. Today's constitutional scholars would be hard
pressed to read our Constitution as giving hierarchical preference
to property rights, regardless of whether they approach the ques-
tion from an interpretivist or noninterpretivist model. Therefore
I again conclude, albeit by a different route, that deprivations of
property were intended to be different from takings of property
for purposes of applying the due process and takings clauses.
The Constitution does not say that citizens must be compen-
sated for deprivations of property-only that they must be com-
pensated for takings. It is easy to speculate about alternative
wordings of the fifth amendment if compensation for deprivations
had been intended or if deprivations and takings were supposed to
be read with one meaning. One possibility that immediately comes
to mind is: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law and just compensation." But
it was not so phrased. That both contingencies-deprivation of
property and taking of property-were addressed simultaneously
supports the argument that those terms were intended to cover
different factual circumstances. While we are constitutionally enti-
tled to fair process whenever we are deprived of property, we are
only constitutionally required to be justly compensated when our
property is taken from our possession for a public use. The fram-
ers must have recognized that the government could not function
for the common good if it had to compensate citizens for every
"deprivation" of private property.'6 But they were willing to foist
applies to every deprivation of property, would prevent a taking for private use by its own
terms.
16. Even Justice Holmes, who ultimately did the greatest damage to the construction
of the due process and takings clauses by trying to combine them into one concept, recog-
nized that government would be hamstrung if it had to regulate by purchase. Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). See infra notes 128-44 and accompanying
1985] 743
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the steep burden of compensation on the government when it to-
tally and irrevocably dispossessed citizens of their property.
Deprivations of property are something less than the govern-
ment's taking title, possession or total control; they are more
properly defined as governmentally imposed restrictions on an
owner's personal use or control of specific property. If a citizen
still owns and controls the property, she can adjust her uses in a
manner compatible with the majority's will (as represented by the
law imposing the use restriction). She retains her personal auton-
omy to decide how to accommodate the state action that resulted
in the deprivation. She may find alternative uses for the property;
she may sell it to someone else; she may even end up benefitting
from the government's restrictions. But if the government takes
possession of her property, she loses all her options. She no longer
has the autonomy of choice. No interest is left to sell, to use or to
control. There is a qualitative difference between a deprivation of
property and a "taking" of the same property, and the difference
is related to options and personal autonomy.
Majoritarian decisions to take private property for public use
intrude on personal autonomy, a highly revered interest within
our governmental value system. But our polity does not absolutely
preclude all such governmental intrusions. John Locke, 7 a father
of our liberal vision of private property and personal rights, rec-
ognized that when human beings joined together into a civil soci-
ety, they wilfully relinquished some of their personal liberty and
autonomy for the greater benefits and protections of group exis-
tence. Their property was not totally immune from state interfer-
ence.18 Our governmental structure incorporates the power to
tax, which is the power to take fungible property, so long as the
tax is fairly imposed on all those similarly situated.19 Our govern-
ment is also empowered to deprive citizens of property in a non-
text for a complete discussion of Pennsylvania Coal.
17. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C. Macpherson ed. 1980).
18. When our Constitution was written, there seemed to be no question that the gov-
ernment had the inherent power to take private property for the public good. See infra
notes 33-73 and accompanying text. If that seemed an impermissible assault on individual
rights, the framers could have forbade it entirely in a bill of rights amendment. It is clear
that they recognized that individual property interests must be occasionally subjugated to
the common good.
19. Some libertarians argue that the power to tax is an impermissible moral restriction
on personal liberty. See, e.g., R. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 265-68 (1974).
744 [Vol. 34
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arbitrary, nondiscriminatory and non-capricious manner. But, it
may not "take" our specific property for the public good without
just compensation because such "taking" unfairly imposes upon
our personal resources.
The takings clause originated as a device to mediate between
individual property rights and the greater needs of the commu-
nity. Citizens were not protected from having their property ap-
propriated for the common good, but only from having to singly
bear the burden of a public project that relied on acquisition of
their private property.20 Compensation was insurance against be-
ing coercively singled out to bear more than one's fair share of
the expense of public works. The government's power to take an
individual's land for public use was a sword against individual
rights; just compensation provided individuals a shield from
majoritarian tyranny. Part of the framers' motivation for includ-
ing the takings clause may have been the fear that in achieving
the public good, strong political majorities might impose unfair
burdens on individuals, especially members of political minori-
ties. 21 By requiring the majority to fairly compensate those asked
to make a sacrifice, fear of majoritarian tyranny under a utilita-
rian calculus could be minimized.22 There would also be some as-
surance that the public would act judiciously (and efficiently) in
selecting the properties it would take.23 This requirement to com-
pensate for "takings"-a severe restriction on governmental flexi-
bility necessitated by the intense interference with personal auton-
omy that takings create-was not necessary for lesser property
20. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499,
502 (1945); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
21. This clearly was Madison's motivation. He feared that the debtors and poor would
join together as a political force and take the property of the rich and powerful. It is ironic
that during the birth of our nation the propertied class feared the unpropertied majority.
In the way it has worked for at least the last one hundred and fifty years, it has been more
appropriate for the unpropertied majority to fear oppression by the economically secure
and politically dominant minority. Query: Is this evidence of how the Constitution has
been a tool to maintain the hegemony of the dominant, propertied class?
22. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964)[hereinafter cited as
Sax I]; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YAL L.J. 149 (1971)[hereinafter
cited as Sax II].
23. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAiv. L. Rxv. 1165, 1217 (1967).
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"deprivations." Other constitutional checks and balances could
adequately protect individual interests.
Therefore, a police power regulation on the use of specific
property, where the owner retains control and possession, should
be considered a deprivation, not a taking.2 This is consistent with
the principles, policies and language of the fifth amendment, but
it is not the rule of law as it stands today.
C. Pertinent Questions in Takings Clause Inquiries
The takings clause, as it currently functions, raises several
critical questions:
(1) What is "property" that comes within the terms of the
clause?25 (2) When is property "taken"? 26 (3) What constitutes a
24. Takings should also be distinguished from taxation. Takings refer to specific prop-
erty rather than general, fungible property.
25. There are three major subdivisions of this question. The first asks: Whose prop-
erty interests are protected? Professor Sax argues that private property rights must be
weighed against public rights in the same property. Sax II, supra note 22, at 156-61. He
defines private property rights as exclusive consumption rights because they benefit only
those people who use or have them, and public rights as non-exclusive consumption rights
that benefit many people in various degrees but have a greater community benefit than
benefit to any individual. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L,
REV. 481, 485 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Sax III].
The second component focuses on a definition of property-is it a "physical thing," a
"bundle of rights," or an intangible entitlement?
A third subdivision challenges whether all things ordinarily contained under the aegis
of property should remain there, or whether certain sorts of "property" should be rede-
fined so as to be exempted from ordinary property rules, especially any taking by the
government.
For some interesting essays on the concept of property see Ackerman, Four Questions for
Legal Theory, 22 NOMOS 351 (1980); Becker, The Moral Basis of Propery Rights, 22 NOMOS
187 (1980); Donahue, The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted From Its Past, 22 NO-
MOS 28 (1980); Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69 (1980); MacRae, Scien-
tific Policymaking and Compensation for the Taking of Propery, 22 NOMOS 327 (1980); Mi-
nogue, The Concept of Property and Its Contemporary Significance, 22 NOMOS 3 (1980). See
also B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); Humbach, A Unifying
Theory for the Just Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERs L. REV.
243 (1982); Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Rogers, Bringing
People Back: Toward A Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 205 (1982); VanAlstyne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights as the Foremost Principle of
Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROS. 66 (Summer
1980).
26. Does "taken" mean that the government must acquire title to one's property? Is
physical invasion enough? Is diminution of its value a "taking"? Are regulations on uses of
property capable of becoming "takings" requiring compensation? See supra text accompa-
njing notes 11-23 and infra notes 104-44 and 216-41.
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"public use"?2" (4) What standard of review should a court use to
assess the constitutionality of an exercise of eminent domain?" (5)
Does the takings clause contain an inquiry into the fairness of the
governmental action?29 (6) If a government regulation so impairs a
party's property right that this party believes the property right
has been taken, does she have a federal constitutional right to
bring an inverse condemnation suit seeking just compensation?30
With attention to these questions, this Article begins with the
history of the takings clause and its interpretations, focusing on its
eventual confusion with the due process clause. Section III elabo-
27. Does "public use" mean "actual use or control by the public" or does it only re-
quire some ancillary public benefit? See, e.g., Lewis, Comment, Corporate Prerogative, "Public
Use" and a People's Plight: Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 4 DEmorr
C.L. REV. 907 (1982); Mansnerus, supra note 15; Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent
Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1 (1980); Schwartz, Note, Real Property-Eminent
Domain-Expansion of the Public Use Doctrine to Include the Alleviation of Unemployment and
Revitalization of the Economic Base of a Community, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1975 (1982); see infra
text accompanying notes 75-104 and 150-68.
28. Should courts defer to any legislative declaration of public use, or should they
make an independent assessment to see whether the taking is really for the public? For
examples of writings advocating a stricter judicial review of public use determinations see
Epstein, supra note 15, at 424-56; Epstein, The Public Purpose Limitation on the Power of
Eminent Domain: A Constitutional Liberty Under Attack, 4 PACE L. REv. 231 (1983); Mansnerus,
supra note 15, at 264-65. For an example of a writing advocating a totally different stan-
dard for assessing public use see Berger, supra note 15, at 225-46 (balancing condemnor's
need against condemnee's harm).
29. Some aspects of this inquiry have been addressed in the discussion of the relation-
ship between substantive due process and the takings clause. See supra note 5 and accompa-
nying text. Many authors have written extensively on this subject. For some interesting
writings see Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model For the Taking Issue,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (1983); Haley, Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to
Test for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REv. 315
(1979); Humbach, supra note 25; McFarlane, Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity of
Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process As a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57
WASH. L. REV. 715 (1981-82); Michelman, supra note 23; Oakes, "Property Rights" in Consti-
tutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583 (1981).
30. The following articles present the major arguments pro and con: Bauman, The
Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the
Inevitable In Land Use Controls, 15 RuTGERs L.J. 15 (1983); Cunningham, Inverse Condemna-
tion as a Remedy for "Regulatory Takings," 8 HASTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 517 (1981); Freilich, Solv-
ing the Taking Equation: Making the Whole Equal the Sum of the Parts, 1981 INST. ON PLAN.,
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN; Leeson & Sullivan, Property, Philosophy and Regulation: The Case
Against a Natural Law Theory of Property Rights, 17 WILLAM rE L. REV. 527 (1981);
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGs CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981);
McNamara, Inverse Condemnation: A "Sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog," 31 BAYLOR L. REV.
443 (1979); Note, Takings Law-Is Inverse Condemnation An Appropriate Remedy for Due Pro-
cess Violations?-San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego (1981), 57 WASH. L.
REv. 551 (1981-82).
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rates on the problems the Court has had in distinguishing between
takings and police power deprivations or regulations. In Section
IV I examine the role of political considerations and judicial per-
sonalities in moving the takings clause further from its principles.
By juxtaposing the Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkifle 1 case with a
Michigan Supreme Court case 2 in Sections V and VI, try to illu-
minate the ramifications of the Court's current direction and ana-
lyze it in light of some respected theories in takings jurisprudence.
Integrated throughout this analysis is a consistent image of re-
sourceful, political, result-oriented constitutional decision-making
that has been effectuated by a distortion of constitutional lan-
guage and principles. I conclude that the Court has moved in a
dangerous direction in interpreting the takings clause that ulti-
mately jeopardizes the needs and interests of the less-empowered.
Finally, I offer a suggestion that seeks a return to a more princi-
pled and less politically malleable interpretation of the takings
clause.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
A. English and Colonial American Eminent Domain Concepts
1. Sovereign Power To Take Land. Early English and colonial
American eminent domain concepts had two distinctly separate
components: government power to appropriate private property
and just compensation3S The first element has been part of our
Western understanding much longer than the second. Coinage of
the phrase "eminent domain" is generally attributed to Hugo
Grotius in the early seventeenth century, but existence of the con-
cept predates his writings.3 The roots of eminent domain may be
traced back to biblical times and Roman law,35 but renditions of
the American derivation usually start with feudalism in the middle
ages.3 Eminent domain has thus been considered a universally
31. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
32. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d
455 (1981).
33. See generally 2A NicHois, supra note 2, § 7.1.
34. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553, 559-60
(1972).
35. 1 NicHoLS, supra note 2, § 1.12.
36. Accord New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 155 Misc. 681, 179 N.Y.S. 299, 300
(1945).
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recognized, inherent, and unlimited power of all governments.3 7
In feudal society, all landowners held their land by the grace
of the sovereign. He was everyone's "land lord." He gave prop-
erty and security to his noblemen in exchange for obligations of
fidelity and payment of feudal dues. His nobles in turn divided
their land up among their vassals. The king always maintained ul-
timate ownership. Feudalism was characterized by these status re-
lationships. Feudal dues included levies on land, provision of sup-
plies and food, and even military service. If a person failed to pay
his dues, the king could make him forfeit his land grant, that is,
disseisin him. What made things especially difficult was that there
was nothing to stop the king from making continuous or repeated
levies on the same property. One payment did not make you se-
cure, like the payment of an annual land tax does. If the king
needed additional revenues for war, his castle, festivities, or some
cause celebre, he could demand additional monies. If the vassal
was unable to meet these demands, he could lose his land or es-
tate. The king could also use any land at any time as forests for
his pleasure hunting.
Before the Norman Conquest, nobles elected the king. 8 Al-
though they always selected a direct lineal descendant of the for-
mer king, immediately before the new king's coronation noble-
men used their power of election to evoke certain guarantees
regarding their rights to continued possession of their lands. This
tradition was retained by William the Conquerer and his follow-
ers. Depending upon the forcefulness and character of the king,
the value of these guarantees varied. Henry II paid them no heed.
Richard I, the lion-hearted crusader, was rarely in England during
his reign to hear his subjects' complaints about the formidable le-
vies laid to support his wars and efforts. His younger brother,
John I, was confronted with the cumulative wrath of the nobles.
Because he was in dire need of their assistance, he reluctantly
signed the Magna Carta at Runnymede in 1215. This document is
often cited as the source of private property protection. Bos-
selman, Callies and Banta provide the following translation of
37. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875); 1 NICHOLS, supra note 2, §§
1.11 & 1.14[2].
38. E. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 53 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as E. BOSSELMAN]. Much of this historical information has been distilled from this
source.
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what was article 39 of the 1215 document:
No freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of his free-
hold, or in any way molested; and we will not set forth against him, nor send
against him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the
land.3 9
While this was certainly not a just compensation clause,40 it was a
precursor to our state and federal constitutional due process
clauses. This provision of the Magna Carta, which became clause
29 when the charter was redrafted in 1225 during the reign of
Henry III, was periodically ignored and reconfirmed by successive
kings. Nonetheless it became part of the nobles' consciousness
that their property was protected from the king's arbitrariness or
excesses. 41
In post-Middle Ages Britain, the concept evolved from pro-
tection against the king to protection against the state. It was this
point that was stressed by Coke and later reaffirmed by Blackstone
in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. Coke and Blackstone
advocated the right of the people to have decisions about their
private property made by Parliament, a representative body that
ensured that the state would not lightly trounce on one's rights.
Coke made numerous references to the Magna Carta as the
source of due process rights for property and of parliamentary
39. Id. at 56 quoting W. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN (1905) (emphasis in the original); see also E. CoKE, THE SECOND PART
OF THE INsTrrUTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1795); Manne, Note, Reexamining the Supreme
Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58 TEXAS L. REV. 1447 (1980).
40. Extensive research into the history of the just compensation notion is found in
Chancellor Kent's decision in Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. ch.
*162 (N.Y. 1816), where he attributed the requirement to natural law. As authority for his
conclusion that compensation was required in that case, he cited Grotius, Pufendorf, Van
Bynkershoek, De Vattel, Blackstone and the fifth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. Further reference to these writers as sources of the "right" to compensation are
found in Berger, supra note 15, at 204; Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of
Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67 (1931); Meidinger, supra note 27; Stoebuck, supra note
34, at 575 (where he traced the compensation requirement to ch. 28 of the Magna Carta
which compelled bailiffs and constables to pay for corn and other provisions they took).
For the original works see E. DE VArrnt, THE LAW OF NATIONS 96 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916);
H. GRoTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PAcds 385 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925); S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE
NATURAE ET GENTIUM 1285 (C. & W. Oldfather trans. 1934); C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAES-
TIONUM JURIS Pusmci LIBRi Duo 218-23 (T. Frank trans. 1930). See also French Code Civile
art. 545; Constitutional Law of Belgium art. II; Fundamental Law of Holland art. 147.
41. Donahue, supra note 25, at 43.
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sovereignty. 2 Blackstone did not object to the state's taking of
one's property, but the taking could be done only by action of the
legislature which was comparable to or a substitute for the
owner's consent. If a person was denied due process he had a
right to go to court.43 Blackstone also suggested that even though
the state had an inherent power to take private property when it
was needed for public use, it had a natural law obligation to fully
indemnify the condemnee."
But neither Coke nor Blackstone would have considered it
improper for a king or legislature to regulate the use of property.
That was an accepted part of life. Since the Middle Ages, London
had been covered by land use regulations. Bosselman, Callies and
Banta included in their history excerpted sections of a proclama-
tion by Queen Elizabeth in 1580 prohibiting further construction
in the City of London to ameliorate problems of overcrowding.45
The Parliament by 1588 had enacted an open space zoning law
that limited construction to one house for every four acres.4 6
There were even laws controlling the type of building materials
permitted. So long as the laws were for the public benefit, justice
was not offended. Colonial America was replete with land use reg-
ulations covering everything from overplanting of fertile land and
what to plant,47 to which land uses were considered noxious and
forbidden. The regulations extended even to building
specifications.48
2. Just Compensation. American colonists understood eminent
domain property law to be a separate thing from government reg-
ulation for public benefit. They came to America distinguishing,
in fact, if not in name, between police power regulations and exer-
cises of eminent domain. It was not that government action result-
ing in a physical taking of property was unknown or unimagined;
the colonists acknowledged the inherent power of the sovereign
42. E. COKE, supra note 39.
43. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Christian ed. 1855).
44. Id. at 138-39. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
45. E. BOSSELMAN, supra note 38, at 64-65.
46. Id. at 65-66, citing Act of Parliament in 1588, 31 Eliz. I C.7 (Statutes at Large,
Vol. 6, at 409). This is not very different from the zoning law that was at issue four hun-
dred years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (suburb of San Francisco
zoned to prevent multiple housing in acre tracts).
47. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 66-68 (1973).
48. Id. at 82-85.
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to take lands for the public good. 9 At that time in history, it was
not the government's power to take property that was unsettled.
What was unsettled was the requirement that the taking be com-
pensated. Early colonial statutes that permitted appropriation of
property for roads and public buildings only intermittently pro-
vided for compensation, and that compensation was limited to im-
provements. There was generally no compensation for undevel-
oped land. Each act of expropriation had to contain a specific
clause providing compensation; without such a clause no compen-
sation was required.50
The first eminent domain statute in the colonies was enacted
in Massachusetts in 1639 for the building of roads. 1 By 1641 the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties contained a provision requiring
compensation to an owner if his goods or cattle were taken. 2 No
analogous provision provided compensation for the taking of land
at that time. 53 The same was true of Pennsylvania's and New
Jersey's first eminent domain laws. Following Coke and Locke
both states required due process (meaning in this context the
owner's consent or parliamentary approval) before land could be
taken, but made no mention of compensation."4 Even as some
states altered their laws to provide compensation for some govern-
ment takings, there was still little opportunity for condemnees to
make constitutional arguments about their rights to compensa-
tion.55 Vermont and Massachusetts were the only states to include
compensation clauses in their original constitutions before the
49. Grant, supra note 40; Stoebuck, supra note 34, at 561-62.
50. Stoebuck, supra note 34, at 579-83.
51. 1 NIcHoLs, supra note 2, § 1.22[2], citing Anc. Chart. 126 (1639).
52. E. BOSSELMAN, supra note 38, at 93.
53. By 1693 Massachusetts had enacted laws that compensated owners of improved
lands whose properties were taken for roadbuilding. An Act for Highways, Mass. Colonial
Statutes (ch. 23, 1693), cited in M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMA-ION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 63 & n.1 (1977).
54. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 53, at 63-64. Both Pennsylvania and New Jersey consid-
ered their original land grants to contain excess property so that the state could eventually
retake it for roads. Professor Stoebuck found that only Pennsylvania contained such a res-
ervation. Stoebuck, supra note 34.
55. Professor Horwitz argued that the greatest impediments to just compensation
clauses were the entrepreneurs who saw it as a threat to low cost development. M. HOR-
wrrz, supra note 53, at 66. Because the tail end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th
centuries were dedicated to economic growth, legislatures readily conferred condemnation
power on private entrepreneurs who would promote economic development.
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federal bill of rights was ratified,58 followed by Pennsylvania in
1800. 57 Professor Horwitz announced that in 1820 less than a ma-
jority of states included a just compensation provision in their
constitutions' eminent domain clauses.5"
No doubt the strongest arguments for including a compensa-
tion provision in our Constitution were found in Blackstone's Com-
mentaries. He was read extensively in the colonies59 and spoke di-
rectly to this matter:
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will
not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of
the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through
the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to
the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without
consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of
the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dan-
gerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge
of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides,
the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protec-
tion of every individual's private rights, as modeled by the municipal law. In
this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does,
interpose and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose
and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an
arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent
for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individ-
ual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does
is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and
even this is an execution of power, which the legislature indulges with cau-
tion, and which nothing but the legislature can perform.60
In 1789, the American people ratified our federal Constitu-
tion. A forceful anti-federalist movement prevailed in its insis-
tence that there be a bill of rights to protect the states and their
56. E. BOSSELMAN, supra note 38, at 94-97.
57. M. HORwrrz, supra note 53, at 64.
58. Now all state constitutions, with the exception of North Carolina, have a specific
just compensation clause. 2 NICHOLS § 6.01[3].
59. D. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILUAM BLACKSTONE 169-75 (1938).
When Blackstone's Commentaries were published (1765-69), Americans were his
most avid customers .... An American edition was printed in 1771-72, on a
subscription basis, for sixteen dollars a set; 840 American subscribers ordered
1,557 sets-an astounding response... and Blackstone's influence on Ameri-
can legal practice was at least potentially immense.
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 88-89 (footnote omitted).
60. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 138-39.
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citizens from the general government.61 Federalists initially pro-
tested the inclusion of a bill of rights as superfluous in light of the
state constitutional bills of rights, and because the federal govern-
ment was a totally different type of government from state gov-
ernments. A bill of rights was a traditional Whig device to protect
citizens against government oppression. In 1789, Federalist James
Madison drafted a bill of rights and presented it in a speech at the
first session of Congress. It included a just compensation provision
directly after its due process clause: "No person shall . . . be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary
for public use, without a just compensation."62 The words were
modified to the present form, but there is no record indicating
why the clause was altered and shortened. No doubt the intent
was the same, but the words have not necessarily been interpreted
that way over the years. Should the word "taken" in our fifth
amendment be equated with the concept of "relinquish" about
which Madison first wrote? Does the lack of debate mean that
there was no disagreement over intention? Is it possible that the
debate was unrecorded? Why was it changed at all?
B. Competing Early American Political Ideologies
Many legal historians and philosophers have asserted that
John Locke's theory of property is at the core of American prop-
erty rights. In the late seventeenth century John Locke published
his Second Treatise of Government which, among other things, ex-
plained the origins of private property. As a dedicated Whig,
Locke wrote to justify his political resistance to the English mon-
archy and to protect his substantial accumulation of private wealth
from governmental interference. American colonists in the eight-
eenth century found his work equally valuable to justify their po-
litical resistance to the English monarchy and to aid in structuring
their new liberal, constitutional government.
For Locke, ownership of property was a natural right. Man,
by his very nature, had a right to life, liberty and estates (which he
later called property). In Locke's vision of the "state of nature,"
61. See generally G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 536
(1969).
62. 1 ANNALS Or CONG. 433-36 (1. Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1789).
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man had perfect freedom and equality. God gave mankind the
earth in common for its self-preservation and comfort and ena-
bled man to use his labor to capture what he needed from nature
to survive and improve his conditions. 3 In order to give him in-
centive to do so, God permitted man to appropriate land and re-
sources through that labor. It was labor, after all that added value
to the land or resource. Because each man "owns" himself, he un-
questionably owns his own labor. When he mixes the labor he
owns with something that mankind owns in common, he is enti-
tled to appropriate that something as his private property. In
other words, man owns himself, his labor and the fruits of his la-
bor. Locke added a proviso that each man is only entitled to pri-
vate ownership of as much of the common resources as he can use
to his advantage without creating waste or spoilage.
Having established that man has these natural rights to life,
liberty and property, Locke explained that man consented to re-
linquish his unbridled freedom in a state of nature and to join
others in civil society chiefly to preserve his property rights." The
role of civil government, according to Locke, is quite limited-it
is to protect and preserve man's natural rights, with a primary fo-
cus on property. Locke defined a liberal, contractarian state, pre-
mised on individual, natural rights. Individuals were joined to-
gether by social contract to protect those rights. Their motivation
was self-interest and self-preservation. The government had only
as much power as was directly given to it by the consent of a ma-
jority of society. Government's authority was derived from this
consent and this consent alone. Government was truly a servant of
the people for the protection of their property.
This model clearly influenced the drafting of our American
constitution. 5 Locke's espoused reverence for property is seen in
the fifth amendment's due process and takings clauses, 66 and fac-
63. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. 5, Of Property, § 26 (C. Macpher-
son ed. 1980).
64. Id., ch. 9, Of the Ends of Political Society and Government, §§ 123-24.
65. R. WOLFINGER, F. GREENSTEIN & M. SHAPIRO, DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN PoLIrICS 41-
42 (1980).
66. Professor Stoebuck argued that Locke's notions were the basis of the just compen-
sation clause. He said that Locke and the writers of the Constitution supported a just com-
pensation clause because they did not think one citizen should have to bear a greater share
of the cost of government than any other citizen. This "just share" principle defined prop-
erty as economic position and protected it from value diminution. Stoebuck, Police Power,
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ets of his view of limited government are seen in the organization
of our federal system. 7 Yet this was not the only philosophy at
work at the time. There were echoes of feudalism and the politics
of Rousseau and Aristotle in the implicit presumption of our Con-
stitution that the community, or government, has a right to take
property for public use. That provision, and some of the other
constitutional language, can be interpreted to exhibit a compet-
ing, republican image of government.0 8
Whereas former analyses of the political ideology of the
American Revolution spoke solely of liberalism and capitalism, 9
contemporary early American historiography acknowledges a
competing ideology of republicanism." This political philosophy
tied into the radical Whig and "country" ideology of English
Commonwealthmen whose theories of government found roots in
classical Greece7 1 and the Renaissance. Republics were peoples
united in opposition to monarchy and tyranny. The republican
image was of equal and independent yeoman farmers, self-reliant
and selfless in their devotion to the commonweal, and bound by
their commitment to public freedom and civic virtue.
This ideal of republicanism was as tied to property as the lib-
Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057 (1980). Judge Oakes emphasized
Locke's influence on Madison, the primary drafter of our constitutional Bill of Rights.
Oakes, supra note 29.
67. Blackstone picked up on Locke's writings and advocated this understanding of a
representative government of limited power. As I noted earlier, Blackstone was widely read
in the colonies. E. BOSSELMAN, supra note 38, at 90 (citing D. LoCKMLLER, supra note 59, at
169-75).
68. I am indebted to Professor Richard Parker of Harvard Law School for exposing
me to this approach towards our political structure through his collected materials for his
advanced constitutional law class entitled "Fears and Hopes in a Democratic Republic."
69. See, e.g., L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
70. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REvOLurrON (1967); G.
WOOD, THE CREAT1ON OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); Shalhope, Republican-
is and Early American Historiography, 39 Wm. & MARY Q. 346 (1982); Shalhope, Toward a
Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicansm in American Histori-
ography, 29 Wm. & MARY Q. 49 (1972); cf. Berthoff and Murrin, Feudalism, Communalism
and the Yeoman Freeholder: The American Revolution Considered as a Social Accident, in ESSAYS
ON REVOLUTION (Kurtz and Huston eds.) (noting that republican ideology became severed
from the reality of industrialized America in the first half century after the Revolution);
Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIsT. REV. 629 (1982) (arguing that re-
publicanism was already an antiquated ideology at the time of the Revolution).
71. These ideas derived directly from Aristotle's Politics and have periodically raised
their heads from the sands. Republican ideology with a focus on its Greek roots was
strongly advocated by Hannah Arendt in the middle of this century. H. ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION (1958); H. ARENDT, BETwEEN PAST AND FUTURE (1961).
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eral contractarian ideology of Locke, but property served a differ-
ent role. For the republican ideologue property was a prerequisite
to an interest in public affairs and the necessary independence to
participate in public debate and decision-making. 2 This is a view
72. Professor Mensch, in her informative article, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property
Rights, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 635 (1982), recognized the role that property played in republi-
can ideology, although she presented a very different image of the alignment of ideologies
in colonial New York. She viewed colonial property rights through the dichotomy of vol-
untarism and hierarchy, rather than liberalism and republicanism. Voluntarism is defined
as an ideology of republicanism's egalitarianism and self-sufficiency, combined with an
Adam Smithian free market economy of independent producers, and a Lockean notion of
entitlement to property through use and occupancy. Hierarchy manifested itself in Smith's
alternative vision of capitalism in a nonperfect market that required extensive accumula-
tions of wealth and capital for purposes of increased production and development. These
accumulations of wealth, power and authority were nonegalitarian and hierarchical. This
competing ideology to voluntarism invaded church, society and politics, as well as the
economy.
While this is an interesting critical analysis of prerevolutionary American ideology of
property rights, I personally find it unpersuasive. I cannot put Lockean individualism in
the same school with republican communitarian notions. Professor Mensch repeatedly ex-
plained the New England land distribution model, as implemented on Long Island, that
provided equal lots for all community members with a common area for the whole commu-
nity's use. Community members' properties were subject to redistribution when new fami-
lies entered the fold. It was commonly understood that people held their property for the
community good, and that if people's shares became noticeably unequal or newcomers
were unable to acquire equal lots, the community members were empowered to meet and
"legislate" a new land distribution. There was no such thing as an overriding individual
right to property. How could adherents of Locke's philosophy of individual, natural rights
of property simultaneously adopt this type of republican social-political vision? To Locke,
civil society was created to protect individual rights to property. For these egalitarian
republicans, civil society was a social community working to promote its common good.
Individualism was only valued to the extent that it advanced the good of all, and it was
always subsidiary to communitarian values.
I would have to argue that a substantial portion of Lockean liberalism stood in opposi-
tion to republicanism. Locke's property notions of acquisition through use and occupancy
(labor theory) supported republicanism, but Locke's theory just began there. He was quick
to recognize that that principle only worked in a state of nature and as soon as money was
coined and society developed, property could be acquired through capital and wealth
rather than labor. At this point Locke's theory serves Professor Mensch's hierarchical ide-
ology better than her voluntarism model. Those who had more land due to political favor-
itism and land grants did not acquire it through Lockean labor-based notions, but Locke's
rationale supported their "right" to buy it, and if given to them, to retain it. Locke's civil
society was organized to protect that very individual right. Republican societies did not
recognize it as a right at all. One did not have rights against a republican government in
the liberal sense in which we understand the word today.
In any case, disregarding for the moment Professor Mensch's characterization of the
two competing ideologies, her work supports this section's thesis that republicanism was a
vital, competing ideology in pre-revolutionary America and that it was directly tied to
property "ownership." As part of the republican community a person had an equal share
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of society under which property is held in trust for public
benefit."
If the takings clause was written with a social view of property
rather than a Lockean libertarian notion, it would have to be ap-
plied differently. Protected property would take on a different
character for different reasons. In addition, since republicanism is
informed by notions of the common good, republican assessments
of "public use" would differ from liberal, individualistic ones.
This sketchy presentation illustrates that there are potential his-
torical arguments that can be made to support alternative inter-
pretations of the takings clause. It is not written in stone that the
clause only protects investment-backed expectations or Lockean
property interests. With these theories in mind, I will explore the
further history of the takings clause and how it was dominated by
Madisonian elitism rather than republican egalitarianism.
C. America's Era of Rapid Development
1. "Public Use" Taken Seriously. The eminent domain clause
proclaimed that the government could take private property for
public use if it compensated the former owner. A corollary to that
belief was the doctrine that the government could not "take prop-
erty from A and give it to B."'" Throughout the eighteenth cen-
of the common land and "property" on which to labor and live. It was possession of land
that gave people independence and permitted them to be self-reliant and innovative.
73. Judge Oakes presented these competing American ideologies through the persons
of Madison and Jefferson. See Oakes, supra note 66. He characterized Madison as having a
"dominion" view of property that was Lockean, strongly capitalistic and highly individual-
istic in a Kantian sense. This view has been adopted by the Burger Court. Jefferson's ideol-
ogy was social and more utilitarian, evaluating legal relations from the perspective of a
social whole or community.
74. This oft-quoted doctrine is usually attributed to Justice Chase's seriatim opinion in
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (8 Dall.) 386 (1798). He used it as an example in explaining his
natural law view that there are certain powers with which no people would entrust their
legislature:
There are acts which the federal, or state, legislature cannot do, without ex-
ceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free republican
governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant
abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; to
take away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for the protec-
tion whereof the government was established... a law that takes property
from A and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to
entrust a legislature with SUCH powers; and therefore, it cannot be presumed
that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our State
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tury most American exercises of eminent domain were for public
projects such as roads and government buildings, including hospi-
tals, town halls, schools, courthouses, fire stations, almshouses, and
public cemeteries.7 5 America had been primarily an agrarian na-
tion of simple virtues and needs. But, the whole vision of America
changed by the end of the eighteenth century to one of capital
development and resource exploitation. 6 It did not take state
governments long to realize that eminent domain could be instru-
mental in accelerating economic production and growth.7 7 Private
property was sacrificed to the cause of progress-it underwrote
America's age of development.7 So, in the process, doctrines
about private property rights, eminent domain, public use and pri-
vate transferees were transformed.79 The law was manipulated to
foster growth at the expense of the formerly protected private
property rights.
Before the Revolution, Massachusetts and other states had
mill acts which authorized the establishment of mills by damming
streams that ultimately flooded the lands of upstream landown-
ers. 0 Despite the burden or harm caused to those whose lands
were flooded, the courts approved these measures as valid exer-
cises of eminent domain because of the important economic and
productive values that the mills offered the communities. It was
not difficult to meet the public use limitation because these grist-
mills were clearly open to the public for its use. In addition, those
whose lands were flooded had available common law actions for
governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the gen-
eral principles of law and reason forbid them.
Id. at 388 (emphasis deleted).
75. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, §§ 7.5111-7.5181.
76. See Meidinger, supra note 27; M. HoRwrrz, supra note 53.
77. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation and Resource Allocation by Government: The
United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. EcoN. Hisr. 232 (1973) (characterized the law of eminent
domain as a product of policy-making on the state level).
"Various states, lacking a tax base and consequently the tax revenue necessary for eco-
nomic development, often conveyed eminent domain power to certain private corporations
to build facilities such as bridges, canals, turnpikes and railways," Lewis, Comment, Corpo-
rate Prerogative, "Public Use" and a People's Plight: Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City
of Detroit, 4 DEr. C.L. REv. 907, 912 (1982).
78. M. HoRwrr-z, supra note 53.
79. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 53, at 31, 47. Much of the following textual material on
the mill acts is based on this work.
80. Berger, supra note 15, at 206.
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nuisance and trespass to complement the statutory remedies.
2. "Public Use" Broadened. Mill owners and prospective mill
owners were dissatisfied with the non-exclusive remedies and ar-
gued that the continuing threat of lawsuits burdened them to the
extent that they would have to forego building and developing.
The Massachusetts legislature was convinced by this argument,
and in 1795 it amended its mill act to create exclusive statutory
remedies for flooded land.81 This act became a model for many
states. In effect, it gave mill owners the power (without prior
court approval) to condemn private property to build their mills
at prices that were unavailable on the private market through vol-
untary exchange or in the courts through adjudication. 2 Private
property interests were blatantly subrogated to natural resource
exploitation and economic development. The wicket became stick-
ier when the mills changed from publicly operated gristmills to
private manufacturing enterprises, such as paper mills, cotton
mills and saw mills. To rationalize the devolution of this power to
these privately owned and operated enterprises, the courts had to
broaden their understanding of "public use" to encompass public
advantage and overall community benefit. 83 Mill owners exerted
continuous political pressure on legislatures to amend the mill acts
to their further benefit. Their successes multiplied as the defini-
tion of public use became broader and more attenuated than its
original meaning. By 1860, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court declared that a public use was
everything which tends to enlarge the" resources, increase the industrial en-
ergies and promote the productive power of any considerable number of
inhabitants of a section of the State, or which leads to the ... creation of
new sources for the employment of private capital and labor, indirectly con-
tributes to the general welfare and to the prosperity of the whole
community."
The middle of the nineteenth century also brought the rail-
roads. Courts were quick to make another exception to the origi-
nal eminent domain interpretation prohibiting compulsory trans-
fers from one private entity to another. Railroad development
81. Act of Feb. 27, 1795, ch. 74, [1794-98] Mass. Acts & Resolves 443.
82. See Berger, supra note 15, at 226-31 (citing Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972)).
83. 2A NicuoLs, supra note 2, § 7.02[2].
84. Talbot v. Hudson, 82 Mass. 417, 425 (1860).
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would have been impossible or incredibly more expensive and dif-
ficult without the power of eminent domain to condemn paths to
lay its tracks."5 The developing ideology of the day left courts no
choice but to give full eminent domain power to these "instru-
mentalities of commerce."8 " First the courts declared railroads to
be public service corporations and imposed upon them special ob-
ligations to serve the public, and then shielded them from liability
for trespass, nuisance and damages as if they were public offi-
cials.8 7 Public utilities were given the same status, as were turn-
pikes, bridges and canals. Just as with the mill acts, what started
out with the idea of public use as being for the public benefit dete-
riorated to private use with incidental benefit to the public.
Almost all the cases in the nineteenth century are from state
courts. The first United States Supreme Court decision about a
state's exercise of eminent domain was West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix.s8 The Court upheld the state's ability to condemn the bridge
at issue and established a policy of great deference to state deci-
sions that lasts to this day.8 9 Since then the United States Supreme
Court has consistently validated state decisions about public use
and has supported state autonomy. 0 States have been given great
latitude within the public use requirement. Only once has the
Court overturned a state's action in this arena. In Missouri Pacific
Railway v. Nebraska,91 the Court simultaneously invalidated the
state's exercise of eminent domain and ruled that the "public use"
requirement of the fifth amendment takings clause applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment concept of due process:
85. Berger, supra note 15, at 208.
86. Mansnerus, Note, supra note 15.
87. See generally Scheiber, supra note 77; Meidinger, supra note 27. Professor Mei-
dinger gives some interesting statistics about the rapidity with which tracks were laid from
1830 until 1880. In 1830 there were almost no tracks; by 1840 there were 3,000 miles of
tracks; by 1860 there were 30,000 miles of tracks; and in 1880 alone, the railroads laid
70,000 miles of tracks. Id. at 29.
88. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
89. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); United States v.
Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903). See also Berger, supra note 15, at 213; Meidinger, supra note
27. It is my contention that the Supreme Court's failure to establish an interpretative floor
for "public use" has emasculated the takings clause and resulted in a license for politically
powerful private agents to take others' private property at prices below those available by
open and voluntary exchange on the market.
90, Scheiber, supra note 77.
91. 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
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"Taking by the State of [private property] for the private use of
another is not due process of Law."'9 2 In the next year, the fifth
amendment takings clause just compensation requirement was of-
ficially incorporated into the fourteenth amendment in Chicago,
Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago.93 In Rindge Co. v.
County of Los Angeles,94 the Court reiterated that it would "regard
with great respect the judgments of state courts upon what should
be deemed public uses in any State."95
3. A Narrowed "Public Use" Concept. The trend toward a con-
tinuous broadening of the "public use" limitation on the eminent
domain power was interrupted around 1837.96 The judicial reac-
tion began in New York, with some courts reacting negatively to
broad interpretations of public use91 in decisions like Bloodgood v.
92. Id. at 417. It is ironic that the state was stopped in its tracks when it exercised
eminent domain rights in favor of an individual property owner and against a railroad,
instead of for it. It is hard to ignore the political positions of the parties in a case such as
this. Permitting an individual to infringe on a railroad's apparently invincible property
right countered the development ideology. It also threatened the course of domination by
the rich and powerful political lobby-railroad companies.
Professor Meidinger concluded his article by emphasizing that any eminent domain pol-
icy reflects the relative political effectiveness of the parties who stand to benefit or lose. See
Meidinger, supra note 27. Professor Horwitz called eminent domain a potent weapon for
the redistribution of wealth from old property to new commercial, development property.
See M. HoRwrrz supra note 53, at 63. Things have not changed. Eminent domain power
has been doled out in a politically and economically expedient manner throughout our
history. It continues to be used in this manner today as we see in the Poletown case. See infra
notes 258-316 and accompanying text.
93. 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). This was the first incorporated right from the Bill of
Rights. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrtTONAL LAw, supra note 4, § 11-2. Before the four-
teenth amendment was ratified, the Supreme Court had decided that the takings clause did
not apply to the states in Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. 20 (1857).
94. 262 U.S. 700 (1922).
95. Id. at 706.
96. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.623.
97. Those interpretations got further removed from any common understanding of
the term "public use." In one illustrative case, Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., I
N.J. Eq. 694 (1832), a New Jersey court upheld the authority of a private corporation to
take land for 70 mills along six miles of the Delaware River by resting its understanding of
public use on the great benefit that would result from the mills' operation, even though the
private owner would undoubtedly obtain the greater benefit. These types of broad deci-
sions support my thesis that constitutional law is merely putty in the hands of the politically
and economically powerful. If it is politically expedient, or conforms with a dominant ide-
ology (like economic development or expansion), the public use limitation in the taking
clause can be effectively eradicated. The principles are sacrificed to politics. While courts
appeared to be developing constitutional doctrine and interpreting the public use phraseol-
ogy, they were, in fact, eliminating it to give free reign to private business and developers.
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Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Co..9s A narrow "public use" test fol-
lowed which required a showing that the public would actually be
able to use the condemned property, rather than incidentally ben-
efit from its use.99 The midwestern and eastern courts which
joined this bandwagon saw their roles as guardians of private
property rights, not as economic calculators of utilitarian values
that defined the common good as private, capital development.100
This vision only shared the stage with the broad, liberal public
benefit reading of the public use limitation; it never starred.10'
The Western states entered their period of rapid develop-
ment after the Civil War. They followed the pattern of using in-
creasingly broader standards of public use to support resource de-
velopment and economic growth. Theirs was a standard of
"4public expediency" and "site necessity."' 2 Some western states
declared explicitly in their constitutions that certain business de-
velopment activities were public uses so that there was no question
about the use of eminent domain power by these industries.'
By the twentieth century most of this exponential growth was
completed. The nation was left with competing definitions of
"public use." The United States Supreme Court left the interpre-
tation of that phrase to state courts, who in turn generally de-
ferred to their legislatures. A federal constitutional right-the
right not to have one's property condemned for private purposes
(or was that any longer the right?)-received no uniform protec-
tion from the political and economic pressures that plagued state
legislatures. States were free to define the scope and dimensions
of this federal right, practically to the point of reading the public
As Professor Bruce Ackerman highlighted in a different context, there came to be a
dichotomy between what a lay person would fit within the language of the takings clause
and how it has been legally interpreted. B. ACERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION (1977).
98. 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837).
99. 2A NicnoLs, supra note 2, § 7.2[1]; Special Project, The Private Use of Public Power:
The Private University and the Power of Eminent Domain, 27 VAND. L. REv. 681 (1974); Man-
snerus, supra note 15, at 413.
100. Berger, supra note 15, at 208; Lewis, supra note 27, at 913.
101. Berger, supra note 15, at 209; Mansnerus, supra note 15, at 414.
102. Special Project, supra note 99.
103. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14. The Nevada Constitu-
tion generally allows appropriation of rights of way to the use of corporations upon pay-
ment of compensation. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8. Accord, Scheiber, supra note 77; Lewis,
supra note 27, at 915; Special Project, supra note 99.
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use limitation out of the amendment. This was, and still is, the
state of the law of public use. When the United States Supreme
Court entered the field of interpreting the takings clause, it had
to tackle the question of what constituted a taking under the fifth
amendment for federal government activity and under the four-
teenth amendment for state exercises of eminent domain. Ulti-
mately it was also required to rule on what, if any, actual limits
were imposed by the "public use" language of the takings clause.
The remainder of this history will trace these major United States
Supreme Court interpretations.
III. MAJOR SUPREME COURT TAKINGS CASES BEFORE 1978
A. Roots of the Takings v. the Police Power Controversy
Perhaps the greatest debate in eminent domain legal scholar-
ship is the relationship between a compensable "taking" and a
noncompensable exercise of police power by a state. Do these con-
cepts intersect to create a third class of "compensable regula-
tions"? Police power is a state's inherent authority to regulate for
the health, welfare, safety and morals of its citizens.104 The fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution limit that other-
wise absolute power by requiring that all police power measures
that deprive a person of life, liberty or property conform to due
process standards. Like the police power, the power of eminent
domain is an inherent governmental power that finds its limita-
tions in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The takings clause
prohibits government from taking property for private use, and
mandates that if it takes private property for public use, it must
pay just compensation. The power of eminent domain has been
described as a subset of the police power.10 5
The Supreme Court has never read the takings clause liter-
ally, yet when it first started approaching this matter, it had no
difficulty distinguishing between compensable takings and non-
compensable police power regulations. Taking did not only mean
a direct governmental acquisition of title; it also included govern-
ment caused total destruction of value or irreparable, permanent
104. It is believed that the phrase "police power" was authored by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 433 (1827); see also Bauman, supra
note 30, at 52.
105. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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injury. In its first decision on the subject, Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co.,1"8 the Supreme Court explained:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing [the
takings clause], . . . it shall be held that if the government refrains from the
absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy
its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent,
can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensa-
tion, because, in that narrowest sense of the word, it is not taken for public
use.
7
The Court defined "takings" to include any physical invasion
of real estate by "superinduced additions of water, earth, sand or
other material, or . . artificial structure . . . so as to effectually
destroy or impair its usefulness . . . ."10 Destruction had to be
total and the injury had to be irreparable and permanent to meet
the Pumpelly test.
In 1878, the Court limited the Pumpelly physical invasion doc-
trine by concluding that only direct and permanent encroach-
ments were compensable. Despite damage to plaintiff's property
caused by the city as it built a tunnel under the Chicago River, the
Court denied compensation in Transportation Co. v. Chicago19 stat-
ing: "[A]cts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers,
and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their
consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a
taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision."
A combination of the rules in Pumpelly and Transportation re-
vealed that impairment of use alone was not enough; two compa-
rable impairments, one with a physical invasion and one without,
would be treated differently. The cases seemed to turn on the
character of the governmental action,110 and not on the extent of
106. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
107. Id. at 177-78.
108. Id. at 181. In Pumpelly the Supreme Court established what has come to be
known as the "physical invasion test" for takings. The construction of a dam caused flood-
ing on plaintiffs land. The Supreme Court determined that plaintiffs injury was compensa-
ble because his real estate was actually physically invaded. The Supreme Court, 111 years
later, employed this same "physical invasion test" in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). See infra notes 242-55 and accompanying text for a
further discussion of Loretto.
109. 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
110. This factor was later incorporated into the Penn Central multifactor balancing
test. See infra notes 167-87 and accompanying text for an exposition of Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
1985] 765
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
injury or diminution in value. This result was consistent with the
tenor of the times which sought to encourage economic expansion
at the expense of private property rights.111
In 1887, a Kansas brewery owner argued for a more expan-
sive reading of the takings clause. In Mugler v. Kansas, 12 the
brewery owner challenged a recently enacted Kansas law that pro-
hibited the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. Among other
things, the law made his pre-existing brewery worthless, which, he
argued, took his property without just compensation in violation
of the fifth amendment takings clause as made applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment. The first Justice Harlan
wrote the opinion, completely rejecting Mugler's claim, reasoning
that governmental takings of property and exercises of police
power are distinctly different in kind. Takings occur when the
government acquires title to the property or uses it for its own
advantage. In Mugler, the government did not take possession or
control of plaintiff's brewery. It did that which is in its police pow-
ers-it prohibited a noxious use of property. Governments have a
duty to protect people from public nuisances, and in meeting their
obligations to the public, they cannot be burdened with require-
ments of compensation.
The brewery owner was free to make any lawful use he
wanted out of his property.1 3 The government did not exert any
control over it, did not destroy it nor appropriate it. Justice
Harlan recognized that there were some limits to the legitimate
exercise of police power, but this case had not presented one of
111. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 53. See supra text accompanying notes 82-95.
112. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
113. Id. at 667-69. To explain, the Court stated:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared,
by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the com-
munity, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in
the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the state that its use by any one, for
certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. ...
The exercise of police power by the destruction of property which is itself a
public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its
value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public
use, or from depriving a person of his property without due process of law. In
the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property is
taken away from an innocent owner.
Id. at 668-69.
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them:""4 "[Courts] are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn
duty-to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter
upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the lim-
its of its authority. '115
In 1894, the Supreme Court further expounded upon its role
in evaluating the substantive fairness of a legislative police power
enactment. In Lawton v. Steele," 6 the Court upheld the power of
state agents to seize fishing equipment used in violation of fishing
regulations.
Lawton established a three-part test, although the Court enu-
merated it as two parts, to evaluate the substantive due process of
an exercise of state authority: "[F]irst, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference: and, second, that the means are reason-
ably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not un-
duly oppressive upon individuals. 11 7 Legislation must have a le-
gitimate public end and the means used to achieve it must be both
reasonably related to the end and not unduly oppressive to indi-
viduals. This case illustrated the close link between the due pro-
cess and takings clauses.116 Government "regulation" of property
114. Bauman compared this "substance over form" due process argument to the "no
set formula" approach courts now use to decide whether there has been a taking. See
Bauman, supra note 30, at 34. He argued that it is erroneous to regard Mugler as a police
power regulation versus taking case with dual standards for each inquiry, and then he
counterposed it to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), which he argued
had a unitary standard for evaluating police power and takings on the same continuum.
Mugler is a "health and safety measure" to prohibit noxious uses. This is a traditional func-
tion of government, and hence it is constitutionally sound not to consider the economic
impact of such regulations. The problem is that zoning and land use regulations are for the
"general welfare" and not "health and safety." Mugler's rules, which work well for health
and safety measures, are inapposite when the purposes of the enactment change.
115. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661. Justice Harlan further explained:
Nor can legislation [prohibiting a noxious use of property] come within the
Fourteenth Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that its real object is
not to protect the community, or to promote the general well-being, but, under
the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and property,
without due process of law.
Id. at 668.
116. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
117. Id. at 137.
118. Mugler and Lawton were the forefathers of Lochner-era substantive due process.
Justice Harlan's comments about the potential limits on police power regulations were ex-
panded by a libertarian, laissez-faire court to invalidate much progressive social and eco-
nomic legislation of the day. This period in Supreme Court history is known by the name
of its seminal case, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Court over-
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was subject to due process limitations (substantive and proce-
dural), whereas government taking of property also had just com-
pensation and public use limitations. The line between the two
types of government action, which today is ambiguous and hazy,
was then so clear to the Court that the next year it dismissed as
meritless a claim by oleomargarine manufacturers that Pennsylva-
nia's recently enacted law prohibiting oleo production unconstitu-
tionally took their property.""'
The issue came before the Court again in Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian,20 when a brick manufacturing plant owner challenged a Los
Angeles ordinance that made brickmaking an unlawful activity
within city limits. This plant had been built outside the city limits,
but as the city expanded, it came to surround the business. De-
spite the facial inequities of closing down a viable business whose
only error was a misjudgment about the extent to which Los An-
geles would sprawl into the suburbs, the Court sustained the regu-
lation as a valid exercise of the police power to abate a nui-
sance.1 21 Acknowledging that plaintiffs property was reduced in
value approximately eighty-five to ninety percent, the Court reaf-
firmed its Mugler position that regulations and takings are two dif-
ferent animals and will not be treated in the same way. The Court
reasoned that the city acted with a public purpose to abate the
nuisance of a brickyard in a residential area, and the means it used
turned New York legislation limiting working hours for bakers. Employing a strict means-
ends analysis, the Lochner majority found no direct connection between the limits of work-
ing hours and employees' health. Ironically, Justice Harlan found himself dissenting from
Lochner because he evaluated the government's ends and means as legitimate, rational and
substantially related.
Lochner-era substantive due process analysis of economic and social legislation reached
its demise in 1937 in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Since then the
Court has exhibited great deference to legislative judgments in social and economic mat-
ters. As I argued in Section I and shall reargue later, this substantive due process deference
for economic legislation is intimately linked to the Court's abstention from interfering in
legislative declarations of what constitutes a public use for purposes of eminent domain
jurisprudence. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The reaction against this discred-
ited Lochnerian substantive due process analysis has infected takings analysis. If due pro-
cess and takings are separate issues, as they are separate clauses in the fifth amendment,
then they should employ different tests to measure their legitimacy.
119. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
120. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
121. On this same theory the Court also sustained provisions regulating billboards on
residential streets, Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); banning livery
stables, Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); and regulating building heights,
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
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were reasonably related to achieving that end.122
Most people who read or hear about the Hadacheck case feel a
great sense of injustice. I certainly do. There should be some rem-
edy for the plant owner. But, that remedy should not result from
a confusion of the police power with the takings clause. If one
looks for a remedy in this one case by distorting the import of the
constitutional principles and language, there will be unfortunate
results in future cases. Distorted language tends to compound its
own distortions like errant snowballs in avalanches. Therefore, de-
spite my feeling that the Court erred by not finding an appropri-
ate means to do justice in that case, I admire its adherence to the
constitutional structure that separates exercises of police power
from takings.123
The Supreme Court's clear vision of the distinction between
police power and takings did not sit well with one Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court judge. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
believed that the difference between a proper exercise of police
power and an unconstitutional one was a matter of degree, not a
matter of kind as Justice Harlan had indicated in Mugler1 24 and as
Chief Justice Shaw, also of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, said in his famous opinion in Commonwealth v. Alger.1 25 Jus-
122. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 408-14. Justice McKenna commented that the police
power may be used to eradicate private interest obstacles that impede the progressive
march toward the public or community good.
It is ironic that McKenna would make such an argument preferring community inter-
ests over private ones, when he was a stalwart in the Lochnerian majority overturning pro-
gressive social legislation because it trounced private liberty of contract. The irony is signif-
icantly reduced if we step back and view what interests were furthered in each case-the
wealthier bakery owners over their labor force and the wealthier class of suburbanites over
the single brickmaking factory. I can't help but wonder if Hadacheck would have been de-
cided differently if it had been the plant owner against the workers in their neighborhood
instead of against the rising economic class in the suburbs.
123. I believe there were other legal mechanisms through which justice and substan-
tive fairness could have been accomplished in Hadacheck. I do not for a moment intend to
convey a sense that rules should be uniformly and rigidly applied, even if blatant injustices
result. I reject positions that elevate form over substance. Achieving fair and just solutions
to problems does not require constitutional distortions so long as our Constitution rests on
principles of fairness and justice.
124. Justice Holmes even expressed his dismay with Mugler in his personal correspon-
dence. I HoLmEs-LASKI LETrRS 473 (M. Howe ed. 1953), cited in Bauman, supra note 30,
at 38.
125. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1853). The Alger decision followed on the coattails of
another Shaw opinion, Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (II Met.) 55 (1846), which
spoke of the difference between police power and takings. These cases also found support
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tice Holmes began expressing his opposing views on the matter in
Rideout v. Knox, 20 where he stated:
It may be said that the difference is only one of degree: most differences are,
when nicely analyzed. At any rate, difference of degree is one of the distinc-
tions by which the right of the legislature to exercise the police power is
determined. Some small limitations of previously existing rights incident to
property may be imposed for the sake of preventing a manifest evil; larger
ones could not be except by the exercise of the right of eminent domain. 127
In 1902, when Holmes was already in his sixties, Theodore
Roosevelt appointed him to the United States Supreme Court. In
this forum he pressed his "difference in degree" formulation and
by 1922, he wrote the opinion in what turned out to be the semi-
nal eminent domain case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 28 In it
he locked horns with Justice Brandeis who wrote a vigorous dis-
sent.1 29 So much has been written about Pennsylvania Coal that it
seems unnecessary to do an extensive analysis here.130 It was a bla-
in earlier New York cases that distinguished between takings and police power with respect
to regulations about cemeteries and internment of bodies within the city limits. See, e.g.,
Coates v. Mayor, Alderman & Commonalty of New York, 7 Cow. 585 (N.Y. 1827); Brick
Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826).
Shaw's Alger opinion upheld a regulation that circumscribed the plaintiff's freedom to
build a large wharf into Boston Harbor. He stated:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil
society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be
his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injuri-
ous to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of
their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . . This is very
different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take
and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency
requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable com-
pensation therefor. . . . Nor does the prohibition of such noxious use of prop-
erty ... injurious to the public ... although it may diminish the profits of the
owner, make it an appropriation to a public use, so as to entitle the owner to
compensation. . . . It is not an appropriation of the property to a public use,
but the restraint of an injurious private use by the owner, and it is therefore
not within the principle of property taken under the right of eminent domain.
61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 84-86.
126. 148 Mass. 368 (1889).
127. Id. at 372.
128. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
129. Id. at 416-22.
130. E.g., B. AcKERM AN, supra note 25, at 163-66; E. Bossam AN, supra note 38, at 126-
28; L. TRIBE, supra note 4, §§ 8-5 & 9-3; Bauman, supra note 30; Oakes, supra note 29, at
603-09; Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL L. REv.
561 (1984); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057,
1062-65 (1980).
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tant and undisguised contradiction of Mugler,1 3 1 yet did not over-
rule it. Holmes, in his majority opinion, determined that the
Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania statute designed to protect homeown-
ers from the collapse of the surface of their property by prohibit-
ing coal companies from doing underground mining that
threatened surface subsidence, deprived the coal company of its
property without just compensation. That regulation amounted to
a taking because it made "it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal"-in other words, it went "too far." '  Justice
Holmes stated: "One fact for consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the ques-
tion depends upon the particular facts.213 3
Holmes finally got his way. He altered the federal Constitu-
tion by interchanging the notions of takings and deprivations by
police power regulations. By using a "difference in degree" test,
he could measure all government actions respecting property, re-
gardless of their character, on the same yardstick. Even if this was
a reasonable policy to write into our Constitution, a position with
which I cannot agree, he picked an outrageous case in which to do
so. 113 It hardly seems possible that the same man who dissented in
Lochner because it seemed to enact the judges' personal philoso-
131. Of course, there are commentators who have managed to reconcile the two.
Bauman said that Pennsylvania Coal "flow[s] from [Mugler] by a natural progression of
thought." Bauman, supra note 30, at 39.
132. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414. "The general rule at least is, that while prop-
erty may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking." Id. at 415.
It is interesting to note that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
had before it a remake of the Pennsylvania Coal case. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v.
Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1985). A statute that was the Kohler Act in thin disguise
was found constitutional because of deference to legislative decisions as required by Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 309-16.
133. Id. at 413.
134. Bauman, who lauds Holmes' decision in Pennsylvania Coal, argued that a state
should be treated differently depending upon whether it is acting for the public health or
safety, or for the general welfare, Bauman, supra note 30. Applying that standard, which
Bauman believed reconciles Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes still should have upheld
the law. It takes a very peculiar construction of the facts to find that a law designed to
prevent houses from collapsing into underground mines is not a health and safety measure.
Somehow, Holmes tried to explain that the Kohler Act case only involved one family and
one dwelling. His arguments must have been as unconvincing then as they seem now, but
he persuaded all the other Justices, except Justice Brandeis, to agree with him.
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phies about society instead of assenting to the philosophy of the
representative legislature135 would find the legislative determina-
tion about "safety" in the Kohler Act so disposable.1 3 6 I can only
conclude that he decided this case in this fashion because it was a
vehicle to promote his "difference in degree" philosophy.
1 3 7
135. In Lochner, the Supreme Court majority overturned a New York law that pre-
scribed maximum working hours for bakers in an attempt to advance their health and
safety. The conservative majority argued that this sort of legislation interfered with the
parties' liberty of contract. Holmes dissented and chastised the majority for implementing
their personal political-social-economic visions:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I
should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do
not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement
or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitu-
tions and state laws may regulate life in many ways . . . . The liberty of the
citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of
others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writ-
ers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or mu-
nicipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable,
whether he likes it or not. The fourteenth amendment does not enact Mr. Her-
bert Spencer's Social Statics . . . . [Some of the laws this Court has recently
approved may] embody convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to
share. Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen
to the state or of laissezfaire. . . . A reasonable man might think [the baker's
maximum hour regulation] a proper measure on the score of health. Men
whom I certainly could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold it as a first
installment of a general regulation of the hours of work.
190 U.S. at 76.
136. Holmes specifically rejected the legislature's finding that this Act was for per-
sonal safety: "Furthermore, it is not justified as a protection for personal safety. That could
be provided for by notice. Indeed the very foundation of this bill is that the defendant gave
timely notice of its intent to mine under the house." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
In other words, Holmes concluded that if you warn someone that their house might fall
in, you have adequately protected their personal safety. Obviously, the Pennsylvania legis-
lature had a different view when it opted to prohibit the event from occurring. It is ex-
tremely inconsistent for Holmes to object to the Lochner majority's invalidation of a law
designed to protect bakers, yet to invalidate a different law designed to protect homeown-
ers from the destruction of their homes.
137. This is an example of my "mastermind" theory ofjudicial opinion writing. There
are other examples throughout this Article. The most commonly accepted example is
Chief Justice Marshall's coup in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), in
which he denied his Court jurisdiction to decide a particular case in which it was known he
had a political preference, in order to assure that it would have jurisdiction in all future
cases involving judicial review of congressional legislation. These are cases where judges
shrewdly advance the political philosophies and ends of the politically empowered under
the guise of a legal discourse in which they assert that the result is compelled by such legal
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Pennsylvania Coal was decided during the heart of the Lochner
era. The Court's conservative majority was regularly overturning
progressive and protective legislation designed to aid labor, regu-
late prices and limit entry into the market, in favor of business
interests. Holmes regularly dissented. 138 He knew that despite his
disagreement with the Court's bent, it was going to continue to
"enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Therefore, in a case
like Pennsylvania Coal which pitted an individual property owner
against a business enterprise like a coal company, the conservative
block would follow its economic and political leanings and hold
for the coal company. If Holmes followed a path consistent with
his views as expressed in other opinions-that legislatures may
fashion laws to protect their citizenry as they see fit-he would
have had to write another dissent. He also would have missed an
opportunity to write his "difference in degree" analysis into the
law. Since he could not garner enough votes to rule in favor of
the ousted homeowners, he could not win anyway. Therefore, I
suspect, he adroitly determined that if he sided with the majority,
he could at least present his "difference in degree" theory in a
majority opinion and get it to be the law of the land.
It was really only a "small" political compromise for such an
important legal doctrine. The result would not change no matter
which way Holmes voted, and he could be reasonably sure that if
he wrote an opinion favoring the coal interests, he would get the
votes of the majority, regardless of his rationale. His only resis-
tance came from Justice Brandeis, who had so often been his com-
patriot in Lochner-era dissents. Of course, I do not know that this
is what he thought or that this is what happened. It does, how-
ever, explain his otherwise inconsistent approach 3 9 and it coin-
reasoning. In fact, they take constitutional principles, as embodied in constitutional clauses
and language, and twist them for their own political ends.
138. See, e.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402, 415 (1926); Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 616 (1917);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 190
(1908).
139. In addition to the inconsistency of this opinion with his Lochner dissent and the
dissents he wrote in the cases cited in note 138, supra, Justice Holmes wrote the majority
opinion in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), the preceding year. In Block, Holmes found
that a rent control law was a reasonable means by which to deal with the housing problems
in the District of Columbia during the War, even though it prohibited landlords from
evicting tenants at the expiration of their leases (hence, temporarily appropriating the full
use of the property at a fixed price below what the market would bring):
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cides with his earlier opinions from the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. How can Pennsylvania Coal legitimately be distin-
guished from Mugler and Hadacheck-cases the Court did not
overrule? Can this opinion be reconciled with Holmes' majority
opinion in Block v. Hirsh140 or his dissent in Lochner? I can find no
justification except his overwhelming desire to shape the takings
jurisprudence into his "difference in degree" theory.
Regardless of his motivation, Holmes did make the "differ-
ence in degree" test part of American constitutional takings juris-
prudence. But it did not answer all questions for all time. What
These cases are enough to establish that a public exigency will justify the legis-
lature in restricting property rights in land to a certain extent without compen-
sation. But if to answer one need the legislature may limit height, to answer
another it may limit rent. We do not perceive any reason for denying the justifi-
cation held good in the foregoing cases to a law limiting the property rights
now in question if the public exigency requires that. . . . Congress has stated
the . . . danger to the public health in the existing condition of things ...
Housing is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest justifying
some degree of public control are present.
Id. at 156.
Why was it less reasonable for the Pennsylvania legislature to conclude that it promoted
its citizens' health and safety by prohibiting surface subsidence from underground mining,
than it was for Congress to conclude that it promoted public health by preserving the avail-
ability of affordable rental housing in Washington? Holmes spoke of a public exigency; but
aren't collapsing houses a public exigency? If they collapsed due to earthquakes, would that
be a public exigency? He would have had no difficulty in upholding legislation that would
prevent further destruction or would help residents acquire adequate, safe housing.
Holmes' emphasis on housing as being particularly imbued with the public interest also cuts
against his decision in Pennsylvania Coal. A good argument could have been made that the
Pennsylvania law was a reasonable means of dealing with housing problems because if a
house does subside with the surface, the homeowners will have to find new housing. It
could have been construed as a prophylactic housing measure in addition to its public
safety and health purpose.
The limiting of bakers' work hours affected the economics of bakeries in New York,
just as the rent control laws affected the economics of the landlords in the District of Co-
lumbia, and the Kohler Act affected the economics of coal companies in Pennsylvania.
Holmes made no mention in his Lochner dissent that it would have been appropriate to
provide compensation to the bakery owners for the diminution in their profits because the
law had resulted in a taking. He did not find that the legislation in Block went too far. What
characteristic of Pennsylvania Coal made it so different that diminution in value was a legiti-
mate concern? The coal companies could still mine in any of their tracts where they would
not cause the earth to collapse under a house or building. They still had control over their
property-they could use it in any lawful manner; they could sell it and they could even
exclude others from it. It would seem that underground activities causing houses to col-
lapse are nuisances or noxious uses which the government has always been permitted to
prohibit without the burden of compensation.
140. 256 U.S. 135 (1921). For a discussion of Holmes' majority opinion in Block, see
supra note 139.
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complicated the takings/police power debate even further was the
Supreme Court's 1928 decision in Miller v. Schoene.' After Penn-
sylvania Coal seemed to sub silentio overrule Mugler's and
Hadacheck's "difference in kind" rationale, the Court unanimously
upheld a Virginia statute as a valid exercise of police power de-
spite the plaintiff's claim that it took his property without just
compensation. A Virginia statutory scheme required the owners
of ornamental red cedar trees infected with cedar rust disease
(which was not fatal to the trees) to cut them down because the
disease spread to nearby apple orchards and was ruining the crop.
The owners were paid for the cost of removing the trees and were
allowed to retain the lumber, but they were not compensated for
the value of the standing trees or the resultant decrease in market
value of their property as a whole. There was no question in the
Court's mind that Virginia had made a conscious decision to pro-
tect the apple orchard owners' properties at the expense of the
cedar tree owners. Justice Stone wrote:
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between the preser-
vation of one class of property and that of the other wherever both existed
in dangerous proximity. It would have been nonetheless a choice if, instead
of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted
serious injury to the apple orchards within its borders to go unchecked.
When forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional
powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to
save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to
the public .... [W]here the public interest is involved preferment of that
interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even of its
destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of
the police power which affects property.1 4 2
Justice Holmes joined in that opinion. What is the difference be-
tween a state's choice to prefer apple orchards to cedar trees and
a state's choice to prefer the preservation of homes and buildings
to some limited kinds of mining? The only difference I can see is
that the first choice promotes the economic prosperity of the state
according to the Court's assessment, and the second does not.
The Court never articulated that rationale. Even if that is the true
basis for its decision, the Court pretended to justify its results on
grounds other than the ground that the legislature made a wise
141. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
142. Id. at 279-80.
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economic decision in that case.1 4 3 The Court avoided many diffi-
culties by regarding Miller as a due process case; Pennsylvania
Coal, on the other hand, was regarded as presenting a takings is-
sue. But, "a rose by any other name would smell as sweet." It
should be becoming more and more apparent that the Court has
manipulated both the facts and the interpretations of constitu-
tional language to reach its desired results, without concern for
the principles behind the distinction between the due process and
takings clauses. The Court left posterity with all the confusion em-
bodied in the co-existence of Mugler, Miller, Pennsylvania Coal,
Block, and Hadacheck as precedents. It is no wonder that takings
jurisprudence has been in such chaosl4
B. Early Zoning and Urban Redevelopment Cases
The 1920's saw two other interesting cases about the regula-
tion of property. Despite the dominance of libertarian, economic
due process arguments in those days, the Court garnered a major-
ity in support of zoning regulations that clearly limited the free-
dom to use one's property as one might choose. Justice Suther-
land, joined by Justices Holmes and Brandeis,4  wrote a majority
opinion for a divided court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,148 upholding on its face a zoning scheme that regulated the
uses of property within delineated districts. Zoning laws were a
valid form of police regulation, and they met the "public use" re-
quirement of the takings clause. Even though a zoning and land
use plan might restrict potential property uses, it would arguably
143. Holmes indicated in his Lochner dissent that the Court has no right to implement
its own economic vision, but should respect the legislative judgment of state legislatures.
Would the Court have reached the same result if the Virginia legislature had required that
the cedar owners be compensated for the value of the standing trees and the diminution in
property values? Or if it decided to allow the apple orchards to perish? Or finally, if it
required that the affected apple trees be chopped down?
144. For just a few of the many cases and articles that refer to the unintelligibility of
takings law, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); B.
AcKERMAN, supra note 97, at 8; C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1977); Bauman,
supra note 30, at 19; Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County In Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63; Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine:
The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. at 351, 353; Mandelker, supra note 30; Sax
I, supra note 23, at 36-37.
145. Even though Holmes and Brandeis were on opposite sides of the fence in Pennsyl-
vania Coal, they often sided together in Lochner-era dissents.
146. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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benefit everyone by its uniform application to specific areas. Every
citizen of the community benefits from having one area zoned as
residential and another zoned as industrial, or one area zoned for
multi-family dwellings and another for single family homes, or so
goes the justificatory rationale. The Court acknowledged that it
might be difficult to separate legitimate from illegitimate exercises
of police power in zoning,147 but decided to defer to legislative
judgment whenever the validity of a zoning regulation was "fairly
debatable."
Two years after Euclid the Court invalidated a specific appli-
cation of a zoning law in Nectow v. Cambridge1 48 Nectow had been
offered $63,000 for his property in Cambridge while it was zoned
industrial. The city changed his zoning classification to residential,
which significantly affected the value of the property. His prop-
erty was adjacent to factories and railroad tracks, and the master
who heard the case decided that it really did not have a practical
residential use. The Court studied the zoning ordinance as applied
to Nectow's property and could find no public interest in this use
regulation. It is important to note that the Court invalidated the
regulation under the fourteenth amendment due process clause,
not as a taking. The requisite community interest in regulating
this land was lacking. The public purpose or community interest
standard was part of a due process analysis in Nectow. Since then,
almost all zoning cases have been decided by state courts. The Su-
preme Court did not even agree to hear another zoning case until
1974.141 Zoning regulations are therefore relatively invulnerable
to constitutional attack.1 50
The Supreme Court encountered its next serious challenge in
the tug of war between takings and police power in urban renewal
147. The next year the Court upheld a requirement that portions of lots be left un-
built. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927).
148. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
149. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
150. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), in which the United States Su-
preme Court affirmed a California decision upholding a zoning law that limited develop-
ment to single family dwellings, outbuildings and open-space uses. There was also a density
restriction that permitted only one residence per acre. The Agins claimed that the ordi-
nance took their property without just compensation, but their plea fell on deaf ears. The
Court explained that if a zoning law substantially advanced legitimate state interests and
did not inflict irreparable injury on the landowner, it would be considered a valid exercise
of police power and not a taking at all. See infra text accompanying notes 216-26 for fur-
ther discussion of Agins.
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cases. Various state courts tackled the problem before it ever got
to the Supreme Court. They had almost uniformly decided that
the elimination of city blight and slums was in the public interest,
and therefore justified the taking of property with just compensa-
tion.15 1 In 1937 the federal government enacted the United States
Housing Act, 152 providing federal loans for slum clearance to
build low-income housing. Naturally, states took advantage of
these funds, and their courts sustained the exercises of eminent
domain. 5 These properties were taken to construct public hous-
ing, thus it was easy to find a public use, as well as to justify the
activity as a public health and safety measure.
An amended approach to slum clearance was taken by Con-
gress when it enacted the District of Columbia Redevelopment
Act of 1945154 to eliminate sub-standard housing and blighted ar-
eas in the seat of government. Land would be acquired and assem-
bled as before, but those portions of the assembled property that
were not to be used for parks, schools, utilities or streets would be
resold or leased to private development companies. The district
plan called for at least one-third of the newly constructed dwelling
units to be low-rent housing. This meant that it was possible for
two-thirds of the property to be sold to private businesses at non-
market prices. This was not the new plan's only difference. It also
required taking more than sub-standard residential housing. It
was an integrated plan for redevelopment of the entire southwest
area of Washington, D.C., and required the acquisition of all pre-
existing property, regardless of its current use.155
151. The first case was in New York in the 1930's. The New York Court of Appeals,
in New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936), decided that
slum clearance was a legitimate public use, justifying the state's acquisition of property
through its eminent domain power. The decision was based in part on the idea that private
enterprise lacked the resources to renew old, deteriorated city neighborhoods on the large
scale needed for urban renewal. Because of this market failure, eminent domain was
needed to accomplish the necessary end for the public benefit.
152. Ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1440 (1982)).
153. 2A NiCHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.43.
154. 60 Stat. 790, D.C. Code, 1951, §§ 5-701-5-719.
155. By 1949 the federal government enacted another type of urban redevelopment
act for the states, similar to the D.C. enactment. The Act permitted resale of acquired and
assembled property to private redevelopment enterprises. Housing Act of 1949 ch. 338, 63
Stat. 413 (1949) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1490d (1982)). See generally Berger,
supra note 39, at 215-16; Meidinger, supra note 27. In this plan the federal government
would provide local agencies with three-quarters capitalization for urban redevelopment
projects, and after the land was razed, it could be sold to private developers. There were
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Owners of a relatively successful department store in the se-
lected redevelopment area objected to the taking of their com-
mercial property, which was not slum housing, to sell to private
developers for their personal aggrandizement. In Berman v.
Parker5" the Supreme Court reviewed the owners' contentions
that this program violated their fifth amendment protections
against both deprivations of property without due process and tak-
ings for private use. Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous
Court, approved the plan while limiting the Court's role to evalu-
atirig whether Congress acted within the scope of its police pow-
ers. The legitimacy of an exercise of police power turns on
whether the legislature acted with a public purpose. Public pur-
pose was broadly defined in Berman:
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and or-
der-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional
application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illus-
trate the scope of the power and do not delimit it. . . . The concept of the
public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values it represents are spiri-
tual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power
of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.1
57
Not only is the definition of "public purpose" open to legislative
determination, but if the legislature declares that its regulations
or actions are in furtherance of the public interest, its declaration
is "well-nigh conclusive." It is not for the judiciary to second
guess this kind of legislative determination, except in the most ex-
treme and outrageous situations of abuse. In other words, if the
legislative ends exhibit an avowed public purpose, the legislation
will be legitimated without further judicial inquiry. This radically
uncritical assessment of ends is still too strict a review to apply to
the selected means. Justice Douglas explained further that if a
restrictions on how the land could be used, but development was not limited to public
housing as it had been in the earlier act. Provisions were made for industrial and commer-
cial development. This congressional action fostered many takings of property similar to
that in the Berman case, see infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text, so when the Su-
preme Court agreed to hear Berman, the legitimacy of many local redevelopment projects
was at stake. Most states had upheld this type of condemnation as being imbued with a
public benefit (the broad public use standard), but some courts, most notably South Caro-
lina, had not. Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956).
156. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
157. Id. at 32-33. Accord, Villiage of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U. 1 (1974).
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public purpose to a legislative enactment is apparent, the means
selected to effectuate that purpose must be left to congressional
determination and immunized from judicial review. This total ab-
stention from review of social legislation represents an over-
whelming confidence in the democratic legislative process., This
extreme deference to legislative judgment is an intricate part of
takings law today.1 59
Legislative deference was not Berman's only contribution to
takings jurisprudence. Berman compounded the problem, which
began with Pennsylvania Coal, of ignoring the distinction between
the due process and takings clauses. In addition to opening the
door to every sort of congressional determination of public pur-
pose, Berman blended all means of effectuating police power ends
by explaining that the power of eminent domain was just one of
several equal means of achieving a legitimate public purpose. By
describing eminent domain powers as indistinguishable from due
process police powers, Justice Douglas effectively erased the "pub-
lic use" requirement from the takings clause. It had seemed,
before Berman, at least to the ordinary reader of the clause, that
the takings clause contained a specific reference to "public use."
Due process has always required that the government refrain
from depriving a person of property without a public purpose."'
Equating the due process clause's "public purpose" requirement
with the takings clause's "public use" limitation made the latter
provision superfluous. Legislation that took property without a
public purpose prior to Berman would have failed the due process
test before a takings analysis could even be performed. Using the
same standard to test both the legitimacy of the government's ex-
ercise of police power and the constitutionality of the governmen-
tal right to take specific property conflates the two clauses. Berman
did just that. Eminent domain was a means of achieving legitimate
police power ends no different from any other. It was subject to
no greater scrutiny than zoning regulations, prohibitions of public
158. This attitude has received great support of late by the so-called process-oriented
or functionalist theorists. E.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DSmu'rw (1980). It has also been
subject to harsh criticism on the theory that many interests are denied effective access to
the political processes that justify that kind of confidence. Parker, The Past of Constitutional
Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981).
159. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
160. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see also
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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nuisances or taxation.
What Berman did was officially 1 approve the transfer of pri-
vate property from one party to another so long as there was leg-
islative approval.1 62 Can this be viewed as anything but constitu-
tional amendment by judicial fiat? 63 The Berman analysis is
particularly worthy of attention because it laid the foundation for
cases like Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,' where the legisla-
ture decided to redistribute land from the few to the many, and
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,6 5 where I would
argue the Michigan legislature decided to redistribute land from
the many to the few. 6"
161. This standard had been adopted by many states, but had never before been sanc-
tioned by the Supreme Court.
162. I am not making an ultimate judgment on whether that transfer has a positive or
negative normative valence. I only state unequivocably that it directly contravenes the lan-
guage and import of the takings clause. Legal discourse was used to transform constitu-
tional language into something inconsistent with its fundamental principles. This was not a
case where the Court needed to distinguish between a taking and a regulation. This was an
out-and-out taking, but the Court applied the same justificatory standards which are used
for a regulation that only limits certain uses. This taking left the department store owners
with no use of their property. How could the Court justify imposing a standard employed
for zoning cases or other cases of regulatory interference with use of property to a case of
taking? And how could the Court let that taking be for private uses in private hands? It
must have been politically consistent with the dominant ideology of "urban renewal;" mov-
ing out the poor and disempowered to benefit the wealthy. If that is the case, I feel com-
pelled to ask what could have motivated Justice Douglas to author this opinion? Is it consis-
tent with his other judicial stands? Were his concerns for the environment and aesthetics
greater than his concerns for the disempowered?
163. If the Supreme Court did, in fact, unilaterally excise the public use limitation
from the takings clause, do the American people have any remedy for this emasculation of
their rights?
164. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
165. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
166. Berman was used as authority for another hauntingly prescient case in New York.
In Courtesy Sandwich Shop Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d
402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963), taking property in a viable, old
commercial neighborhood, filled with history and character (and certainly not a slum or
blighted district), in order to construct the World Trade Center for private businesses and
developers was constitutionally permissible. For two scholars' reaction against this decision,
see Meidinger, supra note 27, and Epstein, The Public Purpose Limitation on the Power of
Eminent Domain: A Constitutional Liberty Under Attack, 4 PACE L. Rav. 231 (1983).
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IV. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE RENAISSANCE: CASES AFTER 1978
A. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
Before I proceed to an analysis of the Supreme Court's Ha-
waii Housing Authority decision of 1984, I would first like to discuss
some of the Court's intermediary ruminations on the vagaries of
the takings clause. Between Berman in 1954 and Penn Central in
1978, the Court made relatively insignificant contributions to tak-
ings jurisprudence. 67
The true renaissance of Supreme Court interest in takings
cases began with Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,'6 8 where the owners of the Grand Central Terminal chal-
lenged New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law 6 9 for tak-
167. Takings issues developed in some cases during this period, but while the subjects
are interesting, they are not sufficiently relevant to discuss here: see, e.g., City of Pittsburgh
v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); National Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395
U.S. 85 (1969); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149
(1952); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
The Court approached the takings issue directly in the 1962 case of Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962), when it used reasoning similar to that in Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), in up-
holding an ordinance that prohibited sand and gravel excavation pit mining, even though
the ordinance clearly deprived "the property of its most beneficial use." Justice Clark clas-
sified the ordinance as a safety measure within the state's reasonable exercise of its police
power. Ironically, after citing Mugler and Hadacheck, Clark also discussed Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). He conceded that a regulation could go so far as to be-
come a taking, but determined that no evidence had been presented in the Goldblatt case to
indicate that the mining prohibition reduced the value of Goldblatt's lot. While Goldblatt
followed the Court's usual course of sustaining governmental exercises of police power, it
left open the question of whether the Court would have found a taking if sufficient evi-
dence had indicated that the value of the property was totally or almost totally destroyed.
This case was remarkably similar to Hadacheck, but it was equally analogous to Pennsylvania
Coal. No doubt the loss to Goldblatt was greater from this total mining prohibition than it
was to the coal company in Pennsylvania Coal, where only mining likely to cause subsidence
was prohibited. See Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), which is discussed later in this section, for a further twist in
this type of analysis.
In 1974 the Supreme Court, in its first zoning case since 1928, upheld an ordinance
limiting land use in a Long Island suburb. The ordinance mandated single-family dwellings
and prohibited groups of three or more persons unrelated by blood or marriage from shar-
ing the same living quarters (in an attempt to chase out "hippies" and students from Stony
Brook). The Court reasoned that governments have great discretion in the exercise of
their police power of zoning. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
168. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
169. New York City, N.Y., 2 ADMIN. CODE 474, ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0-207-21.0 (1976).
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ing their property without just compensation or due process, in
violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Penn Central
had leased its airspace over the Terminal to UGP Properties to
construct a cantilevered, multi-story office building. The lease
gave Penn Central one million dollars a year while the building
was under construction, and guaranteed it at least three million
dollars a year during the term of the fifty-year extendable lease.170
The Landmarks Law required approval by the Landmarks Preser-
vation Commission prior to any construction; this approval had
been denied to Penn Central.
Justice Brennan wrote a lengthy majority opinion for six
members of the Court 7 1 affirming the New York Court of Ap-
peals' conclusion17 2 that the law did not unconstitutionally take
Penn Central's property, nor deprive it of the property without
due process. Justice Brennan started his opinion by explaining
that the purpose of the takings clause was to distribute the costs of
public projects, and to prevent some individuals who happen to
own property which the government needs from having to bear
the full burden and costs of such projects alone. The costs of un-
derwriting public programs by providing land are distributed
through the takings clause's compensation requirement; 17 3 in this
manner they are transferred from the single property holder to
all citizens equally as taxpayers or bondholders. Even with this
clear view of purpose, the Court had been unable to develop a
"set formula" 174 for determining when justice and fairness require
compensation and when they do not. Recognizing that every case
ultimately involves an ad hoc, factual inquiry, the Court identified
factors that needed to be balanced in order to determine whether
170. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116; id. at 141 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171. The majority included Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell.
Id. at 107. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissent in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Ste-
vens joined. Id. at 138.
172. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977), affd, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
173. Justice Brennan quoted from Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960): "[The] Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... [is] designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123. Justice Rehnquist also
quoted this passage in his dissent. Id. at 140.
174. Id. at 123-24. The "no set formula" language originated in Justice Clark's opin-
ion in Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594, and has been used repeatedly in Supreme Court decisions
after it was reiterated in Penn Central.
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a restriction on land use is invalid because the government failed
to pay for the losses it caused.1 5 These factors were: the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation (especially on the claimant's "dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations"); the character of the gov-
ernmental action;176  the necessity of the restriction to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose; and the possibility of
an unduly harsh impact on the owner's use of his property.11 7 Af-
ter measuring the Landmarks Law against these criteria, the ma-
jority concluded that the law did not effect a "taking": "The re-
strictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of
the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use
of the landmark site but also afford [other economic
opportunities]."x 8
In this first modern reassessment of the takings clause, Justice
Rehnquist evaluated the situation differently. Rather than merely
prohibiting certain uses, he saw the New York law as placing af-
firmative duties on the owner of a landmark to preserve the prop-
erty at his own expense. 179 To the dissenters, the very large bur-
dens of landmark preservation were clearly imposed on a few site
owners for the benefit of the community as a whole. Even though
every possible profitable use of the property was not destroyed,
Penn Central lost millions of dollars in potential revenues due to
the law's prohibition against alterations without approval.180 Jus-
175. In addition to the cases it cited for these factors, the Court relied heavily on
articles by Professors Michelman and Sax. Id. at 128. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36 (1964).
176. This analysis would involve a number of questions: Did the government acquire
or take possession of the specific property to facilitate a unique public function? Was there
a physical invasion of the property? Was the interference with property rights a police
power regulation to promote the general health, safety or welfare or to abate a public
nuisance?
177. It is interesting to remember that the constitutional origin of the "unduly harsh"
or "unduly oppressive" standard is found in the seminal due process case of Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
178. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. This conclusion on the takings clause issue com-
ports fully with the due process standard for evaluating the legitimacy of a police power
exercise found in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Justice Holmes' initial blending
of the concepts thus came to full bloom in Penn Central.
179. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 140, 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
180. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that there may have been other acceptable de-
signs for the airspace, but that none had been approved. He noted that Penn Central's plan
to build the multistory complex above the terminal met all zoning, height and building
code restrictions of the city. Id. at 145-46.
784 [Vol. 34
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
tice Rehnquist argued that there were only two situations in which
government destruction of a property's use value would not be
compensable: when the prohibited use was a nuisance, or when
the law that prohibited a use was a comprehensive plan that bene-
fited as well as burdened the restricted property owner. The first
exception is distilled from cases like Mugler, Hadacheck and Gold-
blatt; the second is borrowed from Justice Holmes' language in
Pennsylvania Coal requiring "an average reciprocity of advan-
tage,"18' which has often been quoted in zoning cases.18 2 Because
in Justice Rehnquist's analysis the Penn Central case fits neither of
the exceptions,' and there was clearly an "inability of the owner
to make a reasonable return on his property [which] requires
compensation under the Fifth Amendment,"'" Rehnquist would
have remanded the case to determine if the transferable develop-
ment rights"8 5 given to Penn Central constituted a "full and per-
fect equivalent for the property taken.'1
8 6
The differences between the majority and dissent did not rest
on their interpretations of the law, but on their evaluations of the
facts. Justice Brennan saw a comprehensive plan where Justice
Rehnquist did not. Brennan did not see a destruction of a "rea-
sonable return" on the property where Rehnquist did. Justice
Brennan noted how the building could still be used as it had been
for the last sixty-five years and that, therefore, the law did not
interfere with Penn Central's "primary expectation concerning
the use of the parcel.' 8 7 Justice Rehnquist found that the law de-
stroyed the ability of the owner to get a reasonable return on his
property. When there is substantial damage to the property's in-
come-generating potential, a taking depends upon the character
181. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
182. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 143-47.
183. Nothing about the proposed Penn Central structure would have constituted a
nuisance or been a noxious use. What Penn Central wanted to do was perfectly legal but
for the prohibition in the Landmarks Law. For all adjacent sites, this construction would
have been a permissible use. Justice Rehnquist used this fact to illustrate how this exposed
the landmark site owners to unjust and unequal burdens with no reciprocal benefits. Id. at
146-47.
184. Id. at 149.
185. The New" York law provided landmark owners with transferable development
rights, an economically valuable substitute for the restrictions imposed on the property's
use. Id. at 113-14.
186. Id. at 152.
187. Id. at 136.
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of the invasion, not upon whether every possible use has been de-
stroyed. For Justice Brennan the character of the invasion was the
character of the government's action combined with the extent of
the restriction on the property's total use; for Justice Rehnquist
the character of the invasion was measured only by the dollars or
profits lost. Nonetheless, both agreed that if all possibility of a rea-
sonable return was destroyed, there would be a compensable
taking.
B. Andrus v. Allard
The next year the Court took two more cases that raised tak-
ings questions. In Andrus v. Allard18 the Court denied commer-
cial Indian artifact owners' claims that regulations of the Interior
Department18" which prohibited them from selling legally ob-
tained Indian artifacts made from eagle feathers (and those of
other protected species of birds) constituted a taking without just
compensation. The sellers had acquired the articles prior to the
promulgation of the protective regulations, and they claimed that
their property was now unmarketable. After being criminally
prosecuted for violating the acts, commercial Indian artifacts deal-
ers and appraisers sought declaratory and injunctive relief in fed-
eral district court in Colorado. A three-judge court found that the
regulations were invalid with respect to items that had been pre-
existing and legally obtained, and enjoined interference with the
trade, sale or barter of those items. A unanimous Supreme Court
reversed. 190
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court relied heavily on his
Penn Central "exposition of the Takings Clause." 191 There is no
requirement that the government regulate by purchase, 2 and the
188. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
189. The regulations were promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior in response
to the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1940) and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
16 U.S.C. § 703 (1918). They prohibited the import, export, purchase, sale, barter, or
offer for purchase, sale, trade or barter of any protected birds, parts, nests or eggs lawfully
acquired prior to the effective date of the act. 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.2(a), 22.2(a) (1978). The
possession or transportation of these artifacts was not prohibited.
190. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment without a written opinion. Al-
lard, 444 U.S. at 68.
191. Id. at 65.
192. Justice Brennan seemed most enamored of the Pennsylvania Coal language that
made this point: "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
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takings clause preserves governmental regulations that meet the
dictates of justice and fairness. Although Brennan reiterated the
view that takings judgments must be made on a case-by-case basis
and that there is no set formula for these decisions, he made some
very interesting assertions about the types of property rights
which are protected:
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the arti-
facts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a
significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing of the
artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not always
amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of
property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking,
because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety .... It is, to be sure,
undeniable that the regulations here prevent the most profitable use of ap-
pellees' property. Again, however, that is not dispositive. When we review
regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated
with a taking. . . .[L]oss of future profits-unaccompanied by any physical
property restriction-provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings
claim.193
Justice Brennan emphasized his points by citation to the
Mugler line of cases and Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania
Coal. He even distinguished Justice Holmes' Pennsylvania Coal
finding that the Kohler Act's prohibition of certain mining
amounted to a taking because it created a near total loss of profit
opportunity. Brennan said that Pennsylvania Coal involved more
than lost profits; there was also a physical restriction against re-
moval of the coal."' In Allard there was no such physical restric-
tion: Appellees had the right to possess, transport, donate or de-
vise the commercially restricted items. This argument seems
hardly credible, which probably accounts for its allocation to a
footnote; but based on its inclusion in the opinion and the text
quoted above, most readers would conclude that the Court's ma-
jority would not find an unconstitutional taking based upon im-
paired profitability or destruction of a property's best use.195
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. This standard was also cited in Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 124.
193. Allard, 444 U.S. at 65-66 (citations omitted).
194. "It should be emphasized that in Pennsylvania Coal the loss of profit opportunity
was accompanied by a physical restriction against the removal of the coal."
Allard, 444 U.S. at 66 n.22.
195. This seemed in agreement with the tone of Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
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Even though he cited his Penn Central standard for evaluating
takings, which had thoroughly confused takings and due process
issues, Justice Brennan appeared in Allard to gravitate toward a
due process standard for evaluating police power regulations. He
cited all the appropriate due process cases and tried to distinguish
Pennsylvania Coal. He recognized the constitutional principles in-
volved, but he was not quite prepared to undo the history of con-
stitutional distortion that had occurred. Nonetheless, reading Al-
lard's language and focusing on Penn Central's result, one gets the
sense that the Court might have been laying a foundation for re-
newing the distinction between takings and due process
deprivations.
Why did justice Rehnquist join in this opinion after dissenting
in Penn Central?96 Aren't those two positions inconsistent? 97 In
Penn Central, the landmarks law restricted a profitable, desirable
use; here, the regulation against sale or trade restricted a profita-
ble, desirable use. Justice Rehnquist found the first to be a taking,
but not the second. These positions seem inherently incompatible,
especially when applying a "bundle of rights" analysis. Justice
Rehnquist affirmed his commitment to the "bundle of rights" the-
ory of property law by his citation to United States v. General Mo-
tors Co. 198 in his Penn Central dissent;19 9 but is there a legitimate
distinction between the loss of the single strand of property rights
to unconditionally dispose of or use the Terminal's airspace in
Penn Central and the loss of the single strand of property rights to
unconditionally dispose of or use the property in Allard? Could it
369 U.S. 590 (1962), see supra note 167, but turned out to be an erroneous predictor of
future cases, as seen in the Court's subsequent action, and Justice Brennan's plurality dis-
sent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), discussed
infra notes 227-42 and accompanying text.
196. Questions are also raised as to why Justice Stevens joined the Penn Central dissent
and Allard majority. Why did Chief Justice Burger concur in the Allard judgment but re-
fuse to join in the opinion?
197. Is this inconsistency due to his inclination to use due process standards for police
power regulations rather than to require compensation? I think not, because such a posi-
tion would have been even more inconsistent with his Penn Central dissent.
198. 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
199. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting): "[T]he term 'prop-
erty' as used in the Taking Clause includes the entire 'group of rights inhering in the
citizen's ... relation to the physical thing, as the right to ... possess, use and dispose of it.
... The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may pos-
sess'." (emphasis and citation omitted).
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be that Justice Rehnquist was simply not sympathetic to the rela-
tively small economic loss suffered by the artifacts dealers com-
pared to the substantial financial losses to huge business enter-
prises in Penn Central? Do Justice Rehnquist's opinions turn on
how much money is involved or the power of the party whose
property is affected, rather than on any real legal distinctions?200
C. Kaiser Aetna v. United States
These questions were raised in another case decided in 1979.
Justice Rehnquist wrote the six-person majority opinion in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 201 in which the Court determined that the
imposition of a navigational servitude on plaintiff's marina was a
taking for which just compensation was due. Plaintiffs, lessees of a
2021 .~ hprivate Hawaiian pond, consulted the Army Corps of Engineers
before excavating a channel between that body of water and a
navigable waterway in order to create a private marina for an ad-
jacent community of approximately 22,000 people. They "in-
vested millions of dollars" to complete the project. Then, when
the marina was opened, the United States declared the channel
and marina navigable waters subject to a navigational servitude
and public access.
The majority conceded that it was within Congress' com-
merce clause power to promote navigation and to open the ma-
rina to the public, but it must first pay just compensation for the
taking. It was a taking because it destroyed Kaiser Aetna's "right
to exclude others," a valuable property right within the famous
"bundle. ' 20 3 For purposes of the takings clause, the right to ex-
200. I think so. I believe that Justice Rehnquist's decisions are politically and jurispru-
dentially motivated to maintain power in the hands of the wealthy and business interests. I
call this Rehnquist's "money empowers" theory of constitutional property law. It is this
type of political decisionmaking that undermines the principles of our Constitution. It is
particularly assaultive of the whole structure of our legal system when those who employ
this methodology, like Justice Rehnquist, are brilliant in camouflaging their true justifica-
tion and values in traditional legal reasoning or discourse.
201. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). Justice Blackmun wrote a dissent in which Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined. Id. at 180.
202. It is interesting that Kaiser Aetna leased their 6,000 acres from the Bishop Es-
tate, one of the major Hawaiian landholders whose properties were the subject of Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). See infra notes 282-91 and accompanying
text.
203. "In this case, we hold that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the
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clude others is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property. ' 20 4 Appar-
ently the "right to exclude" stick is more valuable than the "right
to dispose of" stick that was determined to be in Allard.205 Some-
how I cannot help but believe that the key to these takings cases
for Justice Rehnquist and some other members of the Court fo-
cuses on the amount of money invested and by whom.200 Justice
Rehnquist 207 repeatedly emphasized the great sums of money ex-
pended in converting this pond to a marina on the assumption
that it was private property.20 8 He spoke of "millions of dollars"
here and in his Penn Central dissent, but the amount of loss to the
Government cannot take without compensation" (footnote omitted). Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S.
at 179.
204. Id. at 176.
205. Yet, in writing his Penn Central dissent, Justice Rehnquist, quoting from United
States v. General Motors Co., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945), listed the major aspects of
property as: "the right to possess, use and dispose of [it]." He never made mention of this
valuable "right to exclude others," but specifically gave credibility and weight to the "right
to . . . dispose of." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The year
after Kaiser Aetna, the "right to exclude others" also lost its preeminent status through
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447, U.S. 74 (1980).
206. Another interesting observation is that this case and Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51 (1979), where the Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, were cases brought
in federal court. In cases brought in state courts, the Supreme Court has affirmed the state
court decisions. Could this be related to Justice Rehnquist's view of federal-state relations?
But see Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (reversing
a New York Court of Appeals decision which held that a cable television company's instal-
lation of its cable facilities, occupying portions of appellant's roof and the side of her apart-
ment building, did not amount to a taking).
207. I feel compelled to make a disclaimer of sorts here. It may seem as though I
think that Justice Rehnquist has the entire Court in the palm of his hand or hypnotized so
that the other Justices jump through his hoops. Despite such appearances, I am aware that
Justices Rehnquist and Burger are not the only voices on the Court. I must admit, how-
ever, that I have continually been surprised at how often their views seem controlling.
208. He also noted that the marina builders may have detrimentally relied on the fail-
ure of the Corps of Engineers' assent to the construction by mentioning that building the
channel would potentially subject the property to public access through a navigational
servitude:
While the consent of individual officials representing the United States cannot
'estop' the United States .... it can lead to the fruition of a number of expec-
tancies embodied in the concept of 'property'-expectancies that, if sufficiently
important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes over the
management of the landowner's property.
Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179. I find this argument unpersuasive because so much that we
do is subject to the power of the government to establish laws as it sees fit in the public
interest, and in most cases our expectancies must fail if inconsistent with the government's
legitimate choice of action.
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dealers in Allard was not worthy of protection or note. In Kaiser
Aetna this great expenditure caused "the Government's attempt to
create a public right of access to the improved pond to go far be-
yond ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation. '20 9
D. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins
In 1980 the Court decided another case relevant to this in-
quiry, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,210 in which the takings
issue was secondary or tertiary to issues of state-federal relations
and free speech. High school students sought to enjoin the owners
of a huge shopping center from denying them access to the mall
to circulate political petitions. California's highest court inter-
preted its state's constitutional free speech provisions to require
these shopping center owners to permit this activity so long as it
was not disruptive. The owners appealed on the grounds, inter
alia, that such a rule took their property without just compensa-
tion in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The
United States Supreme Court unanimously denied the owners re-
lief and sustained the California Supreme Court.211 The Court ap-
plied the Penn Central multifactor balancing test, evaluating the
character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said: "There is nothing
to suggest that . . . this sort of activity will unreasonably impair
the value or use of [the] property as a shopping center. ' 21 2 In
other words, there was no evidence of interference with reasona-
ble investment-backed expectations. Although the invasion was
clearly physical, the Court relied on the fact that it was
temporary.
The majority even noted that the owner's right to exclude
others was not an "[essential right] to the use or economic value
of their property."2 3 Why, when the right to exclude unwanted
people from private property was an essential right to the owners
209. Id. at 178 (emphasis added) (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
210. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
211. Id. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, which enabled him to further
expound on his ideas about federalism and states' rights. There were separate concur-
rences by Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Powell and White. Id.
212. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.
213. Id. at 84.
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of a marina open to a community of approximately 22,000 people
(Rehnquist's emphatic conclusion in Kaiser Aetna), was the right to
exclude not an essential right less than six months later to the
owners of a shopping center open to the public (in Pruneyard)?
Was it that the free speech implications of the California case out-
weighed any private property interest?2 4 Or was it a Rehnquistian
analysis that relied more on the loss of investment expectations
than the destruction of sticks of rights in the property bundle?
Justice Rehnquist backtracked on his Kaiser Aetna assertions about
the essential nature of the right to exclude others-now not every
destruction of the right to exclude others is a taking. The ques-
tion is whether destruction of the right results in destruction of
profits or economic return. This inquiry does not protect the "do-
minion" interest in property which some scholars have defined as
the focus of the Burger Court's property decisions.15 It does pro-
tect capital investment-a dollars and cents issue. The proper
methodology is not a multifactor balancing test, but a test mea-
sured by potential profits or dollars lost.
E. Agins v. City of Tiburon
In 1980 the Court seemed ready to decide a volatile takings
issue concerning remedies for regulatory takings. 1 6 Instead of fi-
nally deciding whether inverse condemnation is a constitutionally
required remedy for excessive regulation of property, the Court
skirted the issue in Agins v. City of Tiburon.1 7 Justice Powell wrote
214. Probably not, since the Federal Constitution apparently permits the exclusion of
political speakers from privately owned shopping centers. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
215. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 29; Radin, supra note 25; VanAlstyne, supra note
25.
216. Eminent domain scholarship was riddled with debates about the proper remedy
for excessive regulation. Some scholars argued that overregulation was a violation of due
process and the appropriate remedy was invalidation of the violative ordinance or law.
Others contended that overregulation was a "regulatory taking" and therefore, the bur-
dened landowner was entitled to damages equal to the just compensation he would have
received had the government initiated condemnation proceedings. See supra note 30 for
articles which give a general understanding of the issues raised and the general debate.
The latter remedy is called inverse condemnation, because the court action is initiated by
the landowner instead of the government to force the condemnation. If the regulation is
excessive, but not deemed a taking, the remedy is an action in mandamus or for a declara-
tory judgment invalidating the offensive provision. It is not within the scope of this paper
to elaborate on the debate.
217. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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the opinion for a unanimous Court. The City of Tiburon pre-
pared a general plan for land use and open-space land develop-
ment which included zoning ordinances with density restrictions
that limited the Agins' use of their five acre tract to the construc-
tion of one to five single-family dwellings.21 The Agins, who had
purchased their property prior to the adoption of the plan and
ordinances, sued the city for two million dollars in damages for
inverse condemnation, 219 and for a declaration that the zoning or-
dinances were facially unconstitutional because they violated the
just compensation clause.
The California Supreme Court decided that the zoning ordi-
nances did not deprive the Agins of their property without just
compensation and that, in any event, the only remedies for exces-
sive exercises of police power restricting land use are mandamus
and declaratory judgment.220 The United States Supreme Court
never reached the issue of the appropriate remedy for a regula-
tory taking, because it agreed with the California court's assess-
ment that the suburban San Francisco zoning ordinances did not
on their face effect a taking.221 Justice Powell explained that tak-
ings questions require a "weighing of private and public inter-
ests, '222 because a finding that a zoning ordinance "took" a land-
owner's property would redistribute the burden of a police power
exercise from one private property holder to the public at large.
Zoning or land-use takings occur "if the ordinance does not sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests ... or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land. ' 223 In other words, a taking
occurs if there is a diminution in market value that includes
preventing the best use of land, extinguishing a fundamental attri-
bute of ownership, or impairing reasonable investment expecta-
tions.224 Zoning ordinances that assure careful development of
218. The city was required to prepare this plan by state law. Cal. Gov't Code §§
65302(a), (e) (West Supp. 1979). The zoning ordinances at issue were: Tiburon, Cal., Ordi-
nances Nos. 123 N.S. and 124 N.S.Uune 28, 1973).
219. The city abandoned its original attempt to condemn the property through emi-
nent domain proceedings. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257 n.1.
220. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
221. The zoning ordinances were tested on their face rather than as applied because
the Agins had not attempted to get a development plan approved. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-
63.
222. Id. at 261.
223. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
224. Id. at 262.
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residential property are legitimate exercises of police power. They
are also fair to property owners who benefit from restrictions on
neighboring lands even as they are burdened by restrictions on
their own.225 Justice Powell, apparently with the Court's agree-
ment, avoided the remedies issue in Agins and sustained an open-
space zoning ordinance 26 merely by reiterating takings buzzwords
and not really saying anything interesting or new.
F. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego
After the Court failed to answer the remedies issue in
Agins,227 hopes for its resolution hinged on San Diego Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. City of San Diego.228 The result was a mixed bag of opin-
ions. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion represented the conclu-
sion of five members of the Court 229 that the Supreme Court
lacked jurisdiction to decide the case. It found the California
opinion to be inconclusive on the takings matter and required a
remand to resolve the factual dispute concerning whether there
was an uncompensated taking. Having determined that there was
no "final judgment" below, the Court found itself lacking jurisdic-
tion under federal law.280 Justice Rehnquist concurred separately,
agreeing that jurisdiction was lacking, but also lending his support
to "much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Bren-
225. This is set forth by Justice Holmes' "average reciprocity of advantage" analysis in
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
226. These types of ordinances support environmental concerns, but they often work
as exclusionary zoning measures by limiting zoned-area property ownership to the very
wealthy.
227. Gus Bauman explained the tension in the property bar about the expected reso-
lution of the inverse condemnation question. Bauman, supra note 30. Agins was so impor-
tant that amicus briefs were filed by the federal government, 23 organizations, 16 states,
and 105 California cities and counties. Id. at 47. Six days after the Court handed down the
disappointing Agins opinion, it agreed to hear San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego,
447 U.S. 919 (1981), which again presented the inverse condemnation issue. Ironically,
both Agins and San Diego Gas were before the Court in the same conference, but San Diego
Gas was not accepted for review until eight months after the jurisdictional statement was
filed. Id. at 97. San Diego Gas and Electric Company was one of the amicus curiae in the
Agins case. For the San Diego Gas arguments there were amicus briefs from the federal
government, 18 organizations, 18 states and 26 California cities and counties. Id. at 47.
228. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
229. Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices White, Rehnquist
and Stevens. Id.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
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nan."231 That vigorous dissent carefully set out Justice Brennan's
revised theory of takings law. It was joined by Justices Stewart,
Marshall and Powell. If Justice Rehnquist's vote is added, a major-
ity of the Court would seem to support the remedies espoused by
Justice Brennan.3 2 It is not surprising to find Justice Rehnquist
supporting this dissenting opinion, because his written opinions
suggest that he is more likely to define governmental regulatory
activity as a compensable taking. What is surprising is Justice
Brennan's stance.
San Diego Gas and Electric Company purchased 412 acres as
a site for a nuclear power plant and convinced the city to change
the area's zoning from agricultural to industrial use. In 1973 the
city rezoned much of that acreage back to agricultural and open-
space uses, and planned to purchase the power company's land by
eminent domain; however, the purchase was contingent upon the
passage of a bond issue. The bond issue lost and San Diego Gas
sued the city for six million dollars in damages for inverse con-
demnation. The power company won three million dollars at the
trial level, but after a long journey through the California court
system, the case was finally resolved in the city's favor with a de-
nial of inverse condemnation damages.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan reasoned that:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-use re-
strictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to pro-
mote the public good just as effectively as formal condemnation or physical
invasion of property. From the property owner's point of view, it may mat-
ter little whether his land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is re-
stricted by regulation to use in its natural state, if the effect in both cases is
to deprive him of all beneficial use of it. From the government's point of
view, the benefits flowing to the public from preservation of open space
through regulation may be equally as great from creating a wildlife refuge
through formal condemnation or increasing electricity production through a
dam project that floods private property. . . . It is only logical, then, that
government action other than acquisition of title, occupancy or physical in-
vasion can be a "taking," and therefore a defacto exercise of the power of
eminent domain, where the effects completely deprive the owner of all or
231. Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
232. It is important to remember that Justice O'Connor has replaced Justice Stewart
since that time and has not expressed her views on inverse condemnation. Rehnquist may
also qualify his agreement in aspects yet unexplained. Nonetheless, it is possible that other
members of the San Diego Gas majority, who failed to reach the merits because of the
alleged jurisdictional problem, would agree with Justice Brennan's formulation.
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most of his interest in property....
In my view, once a court establishes that there was a regulatory "tak-
ing," the Constitution demands that the government entity pay just compen-
sation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected
the "taking," and ending on the date the government entity chooses to re-
scind or otherwise amend the regulation.
2 3
3
Justice Brennan cited with approval Justice Holmes' "differ-
ence in degree" formulation from Pennsylvania Coal and found
that the California court's conclusion that there is no such thing
as a regulatory taking for the purposes of just compensation was
contrary to this precedent. He was persuaded that a finding of a
regulatory taking, even though it was potentially temporary, was
consistent with other Court cases that recognized temporary, re-
versible takings as compensable. 34
What could have prompted this dissent? Is it consistent with
Justice Brennan's other opinions? His previous takings opinions
applied a multifactor balancing test implying that there was a
point at which regulations could go too far and become takings,
but he never seemed to find a case that reached that far.2 35 It is
understandable why Justice Rehnquist would agree that San Diego
Gas should have been compensated for its alleged multi-million
dollar loss, but why Brennan? Dollar amounts of loss did not seem
dispositive to him before. He specifically said so in Allard.2 3 What
else was there in San Diego Gas? How is this different from Kaiser
Aetna where he dissented?2 7
The character of the government action seems less intrusive
in San Diego Gas than it did in Kaiser Aetna, and the economic
impact in each seems comparable. In San Diego Gas, the power
company did not even lose the "right to exclude." Why is it differ-
ent from Allard where the artifact owners' retention of the right
to possess and transport their property precluded the regulation
233. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 652-53.
234. The temporary/permanent question was prescient of the discussion in Loretto V.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
235. In the past, Justice Brennan only cited Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), for its language about how government could not afford to regulate by
purchase. In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), he distinguished Justice Holmes' Penn-
sylvania Coal majority opinion and even cited justice Brandeis' dissent with approval. In
San Diego Gas he cited Holmes' opinion as firm authority for the idea of compensable regu-
latory takings. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 647-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236. Allard, 444 U.S. at 59-60.
237. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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from being a taking in Justice Brennan's analysis? There is no in-
dication that San Diego Gas was deprived of the rights of posses-
sion or exclusion, the rights to sell, trade or devise the land, or
even the right to use it within limitations. They had as many
rights under this zoning law as Penn Central had under the
Landmarks Law, and in reality, both had equally frustrated invest-
ment-backed expectations, if that is to be the measure. These laws
did not infringe on individual (or even corporate) autonomy to
the degree required to invoke the principles supporting the tak-
ings clause. Maybe the property's best or most profitable use as a
nuclear power plant site was destroyed, but Justice Brennan could
not have been more clear in Allard that loss of the most profitable
use does not necessarily constitute a taking.238 Have the constitu-
tional principles respecting autonomy and fair distributions of
government-imposed burdens on private resources been com-
pletely subordinated to questions of pure economic profit and loss
or political power?
The public purpose of an open-space zoning regulation is as
undeniably legitimate as a landmarks preservation law.239 San Di-
ego Gas gets the benefit of the open-space use as much as any
other resident. This is the rationale that has consistently sup-
ported the impositions of zoning laws, as well as landmark preser-
vation laws, without requiring governmental compensation. Why
did Justice Brennan's inquiry arrive at a different conclusion in
San Diego Gas than it did in Penn Central or Allard?240 Has Justice
Brennan changed his mind about what he believes to be the un-
derlying principles? 2 1 Does he now see different interests at stake
in the takings questions? Would he decide Penn Central differently
today on its facts? How about Allard?
G. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
The San Diego Gas plurality's odd twist in takings reasoning,
though admittedly only part of a dissent, was followed by another
238. Allard, 444 U.S. at 59-60.
239. Accord, Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
240. Or, for that matter, Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419.
241. Bauman, supra note 30, at 98-99, congratulated Brennan on his opinion in San
Diego Gas, and stated that it is the epitome of Brennan's civil libertarian perspective. Need-
less to say, I disagree.
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bizzare decision. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.24 2
was as strange in its result as in its alignment of Justices. Justice
Marshall wrote the majority opinion which re-established a per se
rule24 3 for takings; this rule is based on physical invasions, regard-
less of their magnitude, their degree of intrusion, or their level of
interference with investment-backed expectations. It is true that
some older cases used a physical invasion test to determine if
there had been a taking. While the rationale of the Loretto major-
ity opinion might make sense in the abstract, it seems very inap-
propriate when applied to the facts of this case. I can only pre-
sume that the majority was haunted by a slippery slope notion
when it envisioned the consequences of a different rule.24 None-
theless, the issue and facts did not have to be framed in the man-
ner selected by the Court. The structure the Court imposed on
the problem tainted the outcome.
A New York law to facilitate tenant access to cable televi-
sion 245 required landlords of residential property to permit cable
installation on the rooftops of their rental property and prohib-
ited them from charging their tenants for this service. Regulations
promulgated pursuant to the statute provided a one dollar pay-
ment by the cable company to the landlord for the "use" of the
roof space. Installations involved the connection of directional
taps and a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter.24  An
242. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Justice Brennan, who managed to get Justice Marshall's
vote for his San Diego Gas dissent, could not join Justice Marshall's majority in this opinion.
Instead he joined Justices Blackmun and White in their dissent.
243. Professor Costonis wrote a long article discounting this per se rule and proposing
a presumptive takings model. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model
For the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (1983).
244. Justice Marshall supported his conclusion that any physical "occupation is qualita-
tively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes
affirmative duties on the owner," Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436, by the following logic:
The traditional rule [that any physical occupation or invasion is a taking] also
avoids otherwise difficult line-drawing problems. Few would disagree that if the
State required landlords to permit third parties to install swimming pools on
the landlords' rooftops for the convenience of the tenants, the requirement
would be a taking. If the cable installation here occupied as much space, again,
few would disagree that the occupation would be a taking. But constitutional
protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the
size of the area permanently occupied.
Id. at 436-37 (footnote omitted).
245. N.Y. ExEc LAW § 828 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
246. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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apartment building owner, who had purchased the building with
these affixed attachments, filed a class action suit against the cable
company for trespass in which she alleged that the New York law
effected a taking without just compensation. The city intervened
and prevailed through the New York court system. The New
York Court of Appeals decided that the law did not perpetrate a
taking because there was no interference with any reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations and it did not have an excessive ec-
onomic impact.247 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
"no taking" finding.
Justice Marshall claimed that he was applying the Penn Cen-
tral multifactor balancing test by making an ad hoc, factual in-
quiry into the economic impact of the regulation, its extent of in-
terference with investment-backed expectations and the character
of the governmental action. Yet, he did not balance these factors
at all. The balance was short-circuited by his conclusion that a
government-authorized physical occupation is always a compensa-
ble taking regardless of any other considerations. 48 The other
factors of the balancing test only come into play to assess the
proper amount of compensation. This is a rigid rule.
Justice Marshall believed he was compelled to find a taking by
the bundle of rights theory of property. He explained that when
the government permits a permanent physical occupation of prop-
erty, it effectively destroys a portion of each of the strands (rights)
in the bundle, rather than just interfering with a single strand.2 49
This analysis seems very strained. Mrs. Loretto was not deprived
of her right to lease the building to tenants for profit, to possess
it, to dispose of it, or to exclude others from it. It is true that she
could not rent the space on the roof occupied by the unobtrusive
cable equipment, but there was absolutely no evidence that she
intended to rent it, or that there was even a market for it.250 How
247. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 440 N.Y.S.2d
843, 423 N.E.2d 320 (1981), rev'd 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
248. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
249. Id. at 435.
250. Certainly if the Court in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962),
did not find in favor of the regulated sand and gravel pit owner because there was insuffi-
cient evidence that the property lost all its marketable value, there is insufficient evidence
in Loretto. But Justice Marshall does not require any evidence of loss or diminution in
value, or even harm. A physical invasion is per se harmful; its very existence is "going too
far."
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is Loretto's physical invasion different from Pruneyard's? Where
was the physical invasion of the marina in Kaiser Aetna? Why don't
the regulations in Agins, Penn Central or Allard cut across all
strands of the property bundle as much as the regulation in
Loretto? In all cases some freedom of property use is curtailed, but
in none is the property "taken" in the layperson's understanding
of the word. Could this "physical invasion" test be a distinction
with less than a real difference?25 There was no physical invasion
here-merely a simple police power regulation with minimal (if
any) effect on autonomy or rights in property.
Despite Justice Marshall's slippery slope argument, isn't this
case the epitome of form over substance? Why couldn't the Court
frame the issue in terms of a regulation that required an affirma-
tive duty (that is, for residential landowners to permit tenants ac-
cess to cable television) or prohibited a detrimental use (charging
tenants for cable television access) rather than as a law that per-
mitted a permanent physical occupation? And why is this regula-
tion permanent when other regulatory takings are temporary?
Couldn't the law change and the cable company be required to
remove its equipment?25 2 The characterization predetermined the
result. Maybe it was so framed because if the Court approached it
as a possible "regulatory taking," instead of a physical occupation,
it would have been required to resolve the inverse condemnation
issue that it had thus far avoided.
Justice Blackmun wrote a caustic dissent that received Justices
251. 1 would venture to guess that it is a reasonable rule which, if correctly applied,
reflects the principles embraced by the takings clause. But its application to this case is so
blatantly erroneous that I question its utility. If a majority of the Justices on the United
States Supreme Court can be convinced that a regulation requiring landlords to provide
cable hook-ups for their tenants is a physical invasion, then the test is as worthless as the
power of lawyers to manipulate it.
252. It is also interesting thatJustice Marshall categorized the "taking" as permanent.
If it were regarded as a "regulatory taking," the government action could be viewed as
temporary because the government could rescind the statutory permission. See San Diego
Gas, 450 U.S. at 636-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall concurred with this rea-
soning in the San Diego Gas dissent, but he would not apply it in Loretto. In addition, tempo-
rary physical invasions have been sanctioned by the Court as not effecting takings, where
they did not interfere with the use value of the property. See PruneYard Shopping Center,
447 U.S. at 82-85. It would be preposterous to claim that the cable installation interfered
with the rental value of Mrs. Loretto's apartment building. She even bought the building
with the cable equipment already installedl Rather, there is no doubt that it enhanced the
property's value. Why isn't this an appropriate regulation on which to apply the "average
reciprocity of advantage" test of Holmes and the zoning laws?
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Brennan's25" and White's support. He accused the majority of
"reduc[ing] the constitutional issue to a formalistic quibble,"
"resorting to bygone precedents," and composing "an archaic ju-
dicial response to a modern social problem."'25 Justice Blackmun
recognized that the majority's construction of the issue would
''encourage litigants to manipulate their factual allegations to gain
the benefit of its per se rule. 255 The constitutional inquiry must
determine whether the State has sanctioned some minimal use of
an owner's property. "Any intelligible takings inquiry must also
ask whether the extent of the State's interference is so severe as to
constitute a compensable taking in light of the owner's alternative
uses for the property. 256
This is where constitutional takings jurisprudence stood in
1984 when the Court decided Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkf.257 The
Court had been trying to articulate a workable formula for draw-
ing a predictable (or even reasonably predictable) line between
compensable takings and noncompensable exercises of police
power. A multifactor balancing test was established in Penn Cen-
tral, but was eroded by Justice Rehnquist's "money empowers"
test, Marshall's "per se physical invasion" test and Brennan's re-
treat in his San Diego dissent, evincing a "deprivation of owner's
expected use" test. The Court repeatedly. avoided deciding the is-
sue of constitutionally required remedies for regulatory takings.
Questions of what constituted a public use and standards of judi-
cial review had been put on the back burner in Supreme Court
jurisprudence since the mid-1950's. These issues had been left
solely to the state courts. The Court finally confronted them in
Hawaii Housing. However, before reviewing the Court's resolution
of the issue of the constitutional legitimacy of a land redistribu-
tion scheme that transferred privately-owned land to other private
individuals, it would be helpful to study a seminal Michigan case
involving a private transferee taking.
253. Why did Justice Brennan dissent here after writing what he did in San Diego Gas?
Was San Diego Gas an aberration? Was it the result of a particularly persuasive law clerk
who left before Loretto was decided? Or are these results reconcilable? Justice Brennan re-
garded the San Diego Gas case as a regulatory taking. Why didn't he see this the same way?
254. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442, 446, 455 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 451.
256. Id. at 453-54 (emphasis in original).
257. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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V. POLETOWN AND HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY
A. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit
In the early 1980's, this country was in the throes of a violent
recession; one of the hardest hit by this economic downturn was
the Detroit automobile' industry. From this backdrop, Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit258 epitomizes the pain and
disgrace that desperate economic straits impose on individuals and
communities.
The Poletown case arose from a suit by a neighborhood coun-
cil and area residents to enjoin the city of Detroit from condemn-
ing2 9 their residential property in order to transfer it to General
Motors (GM) for the construction of an automobile assembly
plant. With the decline of American automobile sales, GM de-
cided that it was absolutely necessary to construct a new assembly
plant designed and tooled for a more competitive species of car. It
had already announced in 1983 that it intended to close its Cadil-
lac Assembly and Fisher Body plants, which employed over
10,000 area residents,260 and that it was seeking a location for its
new factory. Aware that labor costs were noticeably lower in the
non-unionized South, GM investigated building its plant there.
Detroit, which was coping with catastrophic unemployment, 261
recognized that if the new GM facility was constructed inside the
Detroit metropolitan area it could retain 6,000 automotive indus-
try jobs, which, by the multiplier effect, could create 20,000 jobs
in services and allied industries.262 The new plant would also re-
258. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
259. The city was granted eminent domain power in an Economic Development Cor-
porations Act. MICH. COMP. LAws § 125.1601-125.1636 (Supp. 1981) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §
5.3520(1)-5.3520(36) (Callaghan 1982)).
260. This employment statistic was taken from Lewis, supra note 27, at 907, 924
n.106, citing Betzold, Push Comes to Shove, Detroit Metro Times, Nov. 13, 1980, at 8, col. 1.
261. The general unemployment rate in the Detroit area was at this time 18%. For
black residents the rate was nearly 30%. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 647, 304 N.W.2d at 465
(Ryan, J., dissenting). In January 1980, Chrysler's Dodge Main plant in this same area of
Detroit closed its doors due to the economic strain on the auto industry causing the loss of
3,000 jobs. A large Uniroyal Tire plant had also recently closed. Bukowczyk, The Decline
and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood: Poletown vs. G.M. and the City of Detroit, 41 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 49, 60-61 (1984).
262. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 650-51, 304 N.W.2d at 467; Bukowczyk, supra note 261,
at 61. Ultimately, GM reduced its expected hirings to 3,000 jobs. Blonston, Poletown: The
Profits, the Loss, Detroit Free Press (Special Magazine Supplement), Nov. 22, 1981, at 56-
57.
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present fifteen million dollars in property tax revenues.2 63 GM was
fully cognizant of its position of power. It offered to remain in the
Detroit area (something it did not need to do) if the city would
rapidly (1) provide it with a rectangular parcel of land consisting
of 450-500 acres, adjacent to railroad lines, yards, and with high-
way access, 264 (2) prepare and grade the selected site for construc-
tion and then sell it to GM at a discount price,265 (3) supply all
necessary utility connections and (4) give it certain tax breaks.2 66
Detroit's Community and Economic Development Department
surveyed nine sites that ostensibly met GM's predefined criteria
and determined that only one was feasible, a 465-acre area con-
suming 320 acres of Detroit proper and 145 acres of the adjacent
community of Hamtramck. 67 Within this area was a neighbor-
hood called "Poletown" because of its ethnic Polish roots and its
site as the cultural center of Detroit's Polish community. Despite
its name and its substantial composition of elderly Polish families
(thirty to thirty-five percent), Poletown was a racially and ethni-
cally mixed, urban community. 268 It was half black (forty to sixty
percent), and it was also populated by Filipinos (two percent),
Ukranians (two percent), Yeminis (one to four percent), southern
whites (two percent) and ethnic Albanians primarily from Yugo-
slavia (five to ten percent).26 9 Assembly of the land for the pro-
posed Central Industrial Park (CIP) required the acquisition of
263. At least this was the conclusion of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Cen-
tral Industrial Park, The Cities of Detroit and Hamtramck, Michigan, at 11-5 (Oct. 1980) [here-
inafter cited as Draft Environmental Impact Statement]. This $15 million figure ignored the
fact that GM negotiated a tax abatement for 12 years.
264. GM demanded title to the entire site and the rail marshaling yard by May, 1981.
Poletown, 410 Mich. at 655, 304 N.W.2d at 469 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
265. GM eventually paid $8 million for 465 acres that it cost the city over $200 mil-
lion to purchase and clear. 410 Mich. at 656, 304 N.W.2d at 469 (Ryan J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 650, 304 N.W.2d at 467; Schwartz, Note, Real Property-Eminent Do-
main-Expansion of the Public Use Doctrine to Include the Alleviation of Unemployment and Revi-
talization of the Economic Base of a Community, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1975, 1976 n.3 (1982).
267. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 636-37, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
Hamtramck is an urban community completely surrounded by Detroit.
268. Poletown was far from the heights of prosperity. With the deindustrialization of
Detroit in the 1950's and 1960's, Poletown lost a lot of its younger population. It also was
hurt by the economic blight of the 1970's. Poletown was depressed, as were many other
American communities in the late 1970's and early 1980's, but it was not a slum.
Bukowczyk, supra note 261, at 57-60.
269. Draft Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 240, at K-I to K-4; Bukowczyk,
supra note 261, at 62; Lewis, supra note 27, at 908-09.
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1,176 structures-the old Dodge Main plant, 1,362 households
and 143 other businesses and buildings including 16 churches, 3
schools and a hospital- 70 -and the displacement of more than
4,200 people.27 1 After negotiations with GM, the Detroit Com-
mon Council approved the CIP boundaries in July 1980; the city
started acquiring the property;272 and a "Project Plan" and "Draft
Environmental Impact Statement" were prepared for submission
to the Detroit Economic Development Corporation. By the end of
October 1980, the city's Community and Economic Development
Department sent a recommendation to the Detroit Common
Council to approve the plans for the CIP. The council did, declar-
ing the project "a public purpose .. .for the use and benefit of
the public. ' 27 3 The mayor affixed his signature on November 3,
1980.
For those residents that could not be persuaded to voluntarily
relinquish their homes, the city utilized Michigan's recently en-
acted "quick take" law, which provided that a condemning
agency's determination of necessity for a taking was binding on a
court, and that title could pass even before a compensation settle-
ment had been reached . 4 An organization of area residents,
churches and businesses formed to resist the takings and defend
their neighborhood. They received support from Ralph Nader's
team and other sympathizers. 27 5 The community, however, was di-
vided over the issue. Condemnation had the support of GM, the
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
270. Bukowczyk, supra note 261, at 62; Lewis, supra note 27, at 909-10.
271. The original estimate of affected people was 3,438, as reported injustice Fitzger-
ald's dissent in Poletown, 410 Mich. at 645 n.15, 304 N.W.2d at 464 n.15. This revised
figure of actual dislocatees is cited in Mansnerus, supra note 15, at 419 n.50.
272. Four-fifths of the property was acquired by voluntary settlements. Bukowczyk,
supra note 261, at 64; Lewis, supra note 27, at 909 n.14.
273. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 653, 304 N.W.2d at 468 (Ryan, J., dissenting). This dis-
sent contains the timetable within which the City completed the entire project from con-
ception to final approval.
274. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 658, 304 N.W.2d at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting); MICH.
COMP. LAws §§ 213.51-213.77 (Supp. 1981) (MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.265(l)-8.265(27) (Calla-
ghan Supp. 1982)).
275. Bukowczyk, supra note 261, at 64; Lewis, supra note 27, at 908 n.9; Mansnerus,
supra note 15, at 419 n.47; Blonston, supra note 262. Protests were organized, some in-
cluding acts of civil disobedience for which protesters were arrested, but the groups could
not even save the Immaculate Conception Church, one of the area's landmarks, from con-
demnation. Bukowczyk, supra note 261, at 65.
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(HUD),"' the Carter and Reagan Administrations, United Auto
Workers union, many young families in the area, and the Archdi-
ocese of Detroit. Finally, the Poletown Neighborhood Council and
ten residents filed suit in Wayne County Circuit Court in October
1980. After a ten-day nonjury trial, the trial court found for the
city concluding that the takings were necessary, and dismissed the
complaint on December 9, 1980. Through an accelerated appeals
process, the Michigan Supreme Court heard the case before there
was a lower appellate court decision. As quickly as the trial court
resolved the issue, the Michigan Supreme Court handed down its
per curiam opinion, acting ten days after oral argument.
The short majority opinion narrowed the question to whether
the taking was for a public or private use. Following Berman v.
Parker7 7 and one of its own cases,278 the Michigan Supreme Court
acknowledged its limited role in evaluating a legislative determina-
tion of public purpose or public use." 9 Despite the strong evi-
dence of public purpose, the Court imposed an allegedly stricter
scrutiny on the taking: it required clear and significant proof of
public benefit in response to the allegations that the condemna-
tions were primarily benefiting GM, a private party. Nevertheless,
the taking satisfied this heightened scrutiny because of its impor-
tance to the people of Detroit and the state.2 0
Two dissents, by Justices Fitzgerald and Ryan, followed. They
both agreed that public use and public purpose were not synony-
mous. Taxation requires a public purpose; eminent domain re-
quires a public use. Michigan law, while using the terms incau-
tiously, distinguished between the concepts, even though the
United States Supreme Court did not. Justice Fitzgerald pointed
out that Michigan always used a "narrow" interpretation of public
use, except in the slum clearance cases, which were clearly distin-
guishable because their purpose was to clear the slums-when
that was finished their purpose was served. Permitting a taking in
this case would require a broad public use interpretation unprece-
dented in Michigan law, that would rest on a primary purpose of
taking land to sell to a private business. Until the land is success-
276. HUD even agreed to fund the buy-out.
277. 348 U.S. 32 (1954).
278. Gregory Marina, Inc. v. Detroit, 378 Mich. 364, 144 N.W.2d 503 (1966).
279. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 632-33, 304 N.W.2d at 458-59.
280. Id. at 634-35, 304 N.W.2d at 459-60.
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fully cleared and sold to GM, the "public use" of the taking is not
achieved. This is not a true "public use," but an incidental public
benefit.
Justice Ryan was even more forceful. He attributed the entire
project to GM-it was their plan, their decision where and what
to build, and their deadlines. No obligations of any kind were
placed on GM as to their timetable for completing construction,2
or whether they had to hire Detroit residents or even a specific
number of workers. The dissenters insisted that in cases like this,
where the primary beneficiary of a taking is a private business, the
government was without constitutional authority to expropriate
land.
The case brings to the surface the twists that have inveigled
into our constitutional value system at an unarticulated level. De-
troit's submissive posture to GM's dominant, powerful economic
leverage contorts the constitutional values written into takings
clauses across the nation. Private corporate interests are translated
into public interests, and then true public interests (like commu-
nity cohesion) are ignored and overlooked. Poletown is a Michigan
case decided on Michigan's interpretation of its own constitution,
but it has broad implications for our society, other states and our
federal takings clause. We must ask what our values are and why.
We must ask what our constitutions protect and what principles
they respect, but will not bend for. Michigan's constitution arches
its back until it lays prostrate in the Poletown decision. Economic
interests, as defined by an oligopolistic corporate enterprise, are
the highest values. The community was faced with problems of
great magnitude that involved economic necessity, but economic
necessity need not have been resolved by one corporation's vision
that conveniently improves corporate profits. Why weren't other
options taken? Why did economic power equate perfectly with po-
litical power? Poletown represented a survival of the fittest story,
where the fittest was a megacorporation that could wield political
clout in the face of a desperate community. It illustrated a brutal
social Darwinism, retreating from advancements we have made as
281. While the city lived up to its obligations by expediting the condemnations and
acquisition of the land, GM's construction has been continuously delayed. The original
expectation of opening the plant in the summer of 1983 had been postponed until at least
the summer of 1985. Bukowczyk, supra note 261, at 68; Lewis, supra note 27, at 926
n.112.
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a civilized people; it was utilitarianism where utility was defined in
terms of corporate, economic prosperity instead of social cohesion
and mutual advancement.
B. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
The Poletown case received extensive national media cover-
age.282 It probably came to the attention of some members of the
United States Supreme Court prior to Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midk f. 285 Could the Supreme Court's decision in Hawaii Housing
Authority have been a comment on, or covert support for, govern-
ment exercises of eminent domain primarily for "private benefit"
as in Poletown? Was Hawaii Housing Authority a perfect vehicle for
shaping law in the Burger/Rehnquist image, just as Marbury v.
Madison was for Justice Marshall and Pennsylvania Coal was for
Justice Holmes? 28 '
In 1967 the Hawaii legislature enacted the Land Reform
Act 285 which permitted the government to condemn large land-
holdings2 86 and sell them to current, private lessees living in sin-
282. E.g., CBS Reports, "What's Good for General Motors .... " 1981; Safire,
Poletown Wrecker's Ball, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1981, at A31, col. 7; Wylie, A Neighborhood
Dies so GM Can Live, The Village Voice, July 8-14, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
283. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Even if it had not, it was cited and distinguished in Appel-
lant's Brief at 34-35, Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
After reviewing a draft of this Article, Professor Richard Parker of Harvard Law
School commented that although it is clear that I, as author of this Article, am very inter-
ested in the relation between Poletown and Hawaii Housing Authority, he did not find this
small piece of evidence sufficient enough to conclude that the United States Supreme
Court was also thinking of Poletown, or a situation like it, when it decided the Hawaii case.
He may be right, in which case the entire premise of this last Section is fallacious. I do not
believe he is (although I recognize that it is a powerful point), but I possess no further
evidence to support my position. In addition to the news media coverage and the case
being cited to the Court in the briefs, I would note that anyone doing research into recent
decisions about "public use" or "private transferees" at the time the Hawaii Housing Au-
thority case was being decided could not miss the plethora of articles mentioning the
Poletown case and its implications. It would have been impossible to do a respectable job of
researching these issues without confronting the impact of any decision in the Hawaii case
upon cases like Poletown. I have sufficient respect for those persons selected as United
States Supreme Court judicial clerks to believe that they found these articles and the
Poletown case. I leave it up to you to decide whether, after this information was brought to
their attention, the Court considered it in deciding the Hawaii Housing Authority case.
284. If my speculations are correct, this would be another example of the "mas-
termind" theory I referred to earlier and discuss again at the end of this Section. See supra
note 137 and infra note 316 and accompanying text.
285. 1967 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 307, as amended HAwAn REv. STAT. ch. 516 (1977).
286. The act only applied to development tracts of at least five acres.
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gle-family dwellings on one acre residential lots. The Act was a
reaction to Hawaii's unique, concentrated landholding system287
with its roots in a feudal tenure system that was originally con-
trolled by one island high chief, subinfeudated to lower chiefs,
and then again to their tenants and farmers. Many homeowners in
Hawaii owned their homes, but leased the land beneath them.
Leases ran for fifty-five or ninety-nine years, and provided that
rentals were to be renegotiated after twenty-five to thirty years.
At renegotiation time, land rents often increased 400 to 1000 per-
cent for the next ten to fifteen .years of the remaining twenty-five
to thirty year term, and could then be increased again. 28 The Ha-
waii legislature determined that the oligopolistic landholding pat-
terns were inimical to the public health, welfare, and safety of Ha-
waiian citizens, justifying reform of the system. They used the
state's power of eminent domain, rather than its police power of
regulation, at the request of the large landholders who convinced
the legislature that the involuntary nature of condemnation ab-
solved them of the excessive tax burdens that would attach to vol-
untary sales.289 It was these potential tax consequences of sale, due
to the properties' low or zero bases, that motivated many large
landholders to retain rather than sell their land interests in the
first instance.
The complicated statutory condemnation scheme provided
that if a certain number of owners of single family houses who
leased in the same tract petitioned the Hawaii Housing Authority
(HHA), alleging their desire and ability to purchase the land un-
derneath their residences, the agency would hold a hearing to de-
termine whether there was a "public purpose" justification for
condemning the land. If it would serve a public purpose to con-
demn the property, HHA was empowered to purchase the land,
by voluntary or forced sale, and immediately offer to sell it in fee
287. Justice O'Connor explained in her majority opinion that:
[W]hile the State and Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the State's
land, another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners.... The
legislature further found that 18 landholders, with tracts of 21,000 acres or
more, owned more than 40% of this land and that, on Oahu, the most urban-
ized of the islands, 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles.
Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S., at 232. See also 1975 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 184, § 1, and Act
186, § 1 (legislative findings) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hawaii Sess. Laws].
288. 1975 Hawaii Sess. Laws, supra note 287.
289. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S., at 235.
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simple to the current tenant, with retention of a 'ight of first re-
fusal for resales within the next ten years. The Act made provi-
sions for up to ninety percent financing, and for the disposition of
property when the tenant residing on it refused to purchase. Af-
ter trustees of the Bishop Estate2 90 were required by the HHA to
sell certain properties in conformance with the Hawaii Land Re-
form Act, they sought a declaratory judgment and injunction in
United States district court to invalidate the Act as violative of the
"public use" requirement of the fifth and fourteenth amendment
takings provisions. 29 1 The district court found that the legislative
exercise of authority was consistent with the "public use" require-
ment and the state's police power, thereby granting summary
judgment for the defendant HHA.9 2
The trustees appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
where they prevailed.293 Judge Alarcon interpreted the Hawaii
statute as a blatant effort "to take the private property of A and
transfer its ownership to B for his private use and benefit. 2 94 He
traced the history of the public use requirement and found that it
reflected James Madison's all-consuming fear that a majority of
unlanded citizens would tyrannize the wealthy landowners.295 The
Hawaii legislation was the very thing the takings clause was in-
tended to prevent. Judge Alarcon spent a substantial portion of
his opinion distinguishing categories of takings that had been per-
mitted despite the "public use" limitation, even though they at
first glance might seem to transfer property from A to B, and spe-
cifically distinguished Berman v. Parker."' Alarcon argued for
more stringent judicial review in eminent domain than in other
police power exercises. Judge Poole's concurrence acknowledged
290. The Bishop Estate was one of the largest landholdings. As an aside, it was the
owner of the converted Hawaiian lagoon leased to Kaiser Aetna in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), discussed supra text accompanying notes 201-09.
291. Other aspects of the case are not relevant to this Article.
292. Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62 (D. Hawaii 1979). The named defendants were
the commissioners of the Hawaii Housing Authority, its executive director and the HHA
itself. Intervenors included multiple community associations seeking to undermine the
oligopolistic landholding system.
293. Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). The case was argued to the panel in October, 1981, and a
decision was not handed down until March 28, 1983. The decision was split two to one.
294. Id. at 790.
295. Id. at 791-93.
296. 348 U.S. 32 (1954).
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his firm agreement with Judge Alarcon's assessment of the public
use issue, but he wrote separately to answer dissenting Judge Fer-
guson's assertions that the federal court should have abstained
from deciding the issue.297
Judge Ferguson dissented because he believed that interests
of comity and federalism counselled the federal courts to abstain
from deciding the merits of this case. 2 8 He also felt compelled to
dissent because he believed the majority compounded its error of
reaching the merits by incorrectly characterizing the facts, and
misunderstanding the relevant law. Ferguson argued that Berman
and other cases required that a state legislative determination of
public use be given the greatest deference. 299 He determined that
the Hawaii Land Reform Act was constitutional.
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
Ninth Circuit.300 Justice O'Connor wrote her first takings clause
opinion. After discussing the abstention issue and deciding that
the federal courts had not erred in reaching the merits, she
quoted extensively from Berman concerning the deference owed
by courts to legislative determinations of public use and public
purpose.301 She reworded Berman's conclusion that the "'public
use' requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sover-
eign's police powers. . . . Where the exercise of the eminent do-
main power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,
the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed
by the Public Use Clause."302 She noted that the Act's purpose to
regulate oligopoly reflected a classic exercise of police power;
once the purpose was determined to be proper, the legislature's
choice of means was not subject to review. 0 3 A compensated tak-
ing motivated by a private purpose of taking from A solely to ben-
efit B could not meet the legitimate governmental purpose test,
297. Id. at 798-99 (Poole, J., concurring).
298. Id. at 807-19 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 813.
300. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (Marshall, J., took no part in
the decision).
301. Id. at 238-39. The Court explained: "Judicial deference is required because, in
our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes
should be advanced by an exercise of the takings power." Id. at 243-45.
302. Id. at 239-40.
303. "[I]t is only the takings purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny
under the Public Use Clause." Id. at 243-45.
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but that was not an issue with the Hawaiian legislation because it
was clearly not enacted to benefit a particular class of identifiable
individuals, but to attack the social evil of oligopoly.304
What does Hawaii Housing Authority mean in terms of takings
jurisprudence? It adopts an extremely broad definition of "public
use,''305 reaffirms Berman's integration of the public use and public
purpose doctrines, and removes determinations about governmen-
tally required private property transfers from judicial
consideration.
It is no mystery to students of our current Supreme Court
that Justice O'Connor's views are closely aligned to Justices Rehn-
quist's and Burger's. Why would she, Rehnquist and Burger up-
hold a land redistribution scheme that distributes from the few to
the many, or from the wealthy to the less wealthy? This sort of
social and economic legislation does not usually rally their sup-
port. Is the Constitution so absolute and definitive that they were
compelled to uphold this plan despite their views about property
rights? Have they changed their views, or can we infer ulterior
motives for the Hawaii Housing Authority decision?
I am again led to my "mastermind theory" of judicial deci-
sionmaking. Regardless of statements by jurists that certain deci-
sions are required by the Constitution, I contend that the Consti-
304. It may seem ironic that here the Court's regular majority block is assailing oli-
gopoly and jeopardizing politically and economically powerful interests, but it was neces-
sary in order to find a legitimate public use/purpose. That majority would have gone to
great pains to avoid saying that redistribution was a legitimate public use for the eminent
domain clause. Had it not included a concept like oligopoly, it may have had to call redis-
tribution a proper purpose, and thus threaten more politically powerful entities than it was
willing to. By referring to oligopoly, it never directly assented to redistribution; and by
extensively describing how this case turned on Hawaii's unique land allocation system, it left
an opening to distinguish it from other redistributive plans. The combination of the oli-
gopoly language and reference to Hawaii's uniqueness could effectively prevent this case's
application to any other land or property redistribution scheme.
305.
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in
the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as hav-
ing only a private purpose. The Court long ago rejected any literal requirement
that condemned property be put into use for the general public. 'It is not essen-
tial that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, . . . directly
enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public
use.'
Id. at 243-44 (citation omitted).
This language is reminiscent of the 1860 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion
in Talbot v. Hudson, 82 Mass. 417 (1860). See supra text accompanying note 84.
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tution has become a wholly malleable document that compels no
particular result. The most it requires is that constitutional deci-
sions conform to a style of legal opinion drafting, a form of legal
discourse that rationalizes results by reference to constitutional
provisions and precedents. Any drafted opinion that can muster
majority support on the Court becomes what the Constitution
"compels." The result or rule can differ entirely from a former
court's "interpretation," or even from the same court's earlier
pronouncements. The requirement of reference to constitutional
precedent serves only to put rhetorical reins on total judicial aban-
don. Constitutional decisionmaking has become political decision-
making-political results translated into legal rationalizations. Jus-
tices ask themselves how they want their society structured; what
theory they believe would promote the dominant ideology of the
day; what they think the rules ought to be; and what they want the
result in a particular case to be. They know where power lies, and
they know how to keep it there. Most judges, whether appointed
or elected, are politicians, or have strong political allies that have
campaigned for their appointment or financially aided their cam-
paigns. They know they have authority to sustain the hegemonic
power structure that put them where they are, and to do so in the
guise of value neutrality and constitutional constraint. Not all
judges have these values, but I believe that a primary motivation
in constitutional interpretation has become reinforcement of the
dominant power structure. Assuming this is the case, is the Hawai-
ian land distribution scheme an exception to that rule? Does it
defy the dominant power structure by redistributing wealth? Why
was it affirmed?
I have found three reasons. The first is that, while land was
redistributed in Hawaii, it was hardly redistributed to the poor or
disempowered. The organizations and homeowners who leased
from these large estates and benefited in the Hawaii litigation rep-
resented upper and middle class families.308 Most of them owned
expensive homes in exclusive developments. The problem in Ha-
waii was a simple market failure to properly allocate land among
those who could afford it. No party in enacting the legislation was
306. See Brief for Appellant at 35, Brief for Appellees at 67-68 n.169, 75, Hawaii
Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. 229. See also The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARv. L. REv. 87, 225-
36, 232 n.66, 233 n.76 (1984).
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advocating land distribution to those, who by reason of social, eco-
nomic or political conditions, were unable to afford it even if it
was available. The Hawaii scheme was not even an example of the
Rawlsian difference principle at work,30 7 wherein primary goods
are distributed in a manner that benefits the least advantaged.
The newly entitled homeowners were, in fact, both economically
and politically powerful. The approved redistribution system did
not noticeably alter the political power structure and hence was
not a "dangerous" decision for the United States Supreme Court
to uphold.30 8
Second, the Hawaii Housing Authority decision is quite consis-
tent with the dominant Supreme Court and conservative "Repub-
lican ' 3 0 9 notions of federalism and states' rights which accede to
state determinations of issues that impact on federally guaranteed
rights.310 This Supreme Court has declared that states have the
power to define what property rights will be protected by the fed-
eral constitution.311 Therefore, in continuing to shift the balance
307. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, ch. II, §§ 10-13 (1971).
308. I would speculate that had the scheme given land rights and their concomitant
political power to the traditionally under-represented and disempowered lower classes, it
would have been so threatening to the Court's majority that the Justices would have found
in favor of the original landed aristocracy. They could have adopted an approach similar to
Judges Alarcon's and Poole's in the Ninth Circuit, or the Poletown dissents' arguments, that
the challenged scheme was no more than a blatant private transfer from A to B, which is
forbidden by our Constitution. Or they could have decided that economic redistribution
may only be done through taxation and that eminent domain is never a constitutional
means by which to redistribute. Eminent domain is available to permit the government to
acquire land for specific public uses, not to give it away to new owners.
If they could not get a majority to agree on a particular rationale, but still did not want
to permit a distribution from the wealthy to the truly poor and powerless, they could have
resorted to a procedural solution. The Court could have refused to take the case, or it
could have argued that the federal courts should have abstained from deciding the merits.
In other words, there were legitimate, available legal tools, as there are in every case, to
reach either desired end. If the redistribution (and the rule it required) was politically un-
comfortable for the majority, it could have found it improper.
309. In this context, "Republican" refers to one of the two major United States politi-
cal parties currently led by President Ronald Reagan and committed to a party platform
that strongly advocates states' rights and the minimalization of federal power.
310. See generally text accompanying notes 210-15. Accord Howard, The States and the
Supreme Court, 31 CATH. U.L. REv. 375 (1982); Bartow, Safeguarding Federalism-Changing
Conceptions of the Judicial Role: From NLC to EEOC and Beyond, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 889, 943
(1982).
311. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 525 (1982); Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160
n.10(1978); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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from federal power to state power, the Court may have decided it
was best to permit the Hawaii legislature this unbridled freedom.
Clearly this position grants states unfettered discretion in the use
of their eminent domain powers, but I think it was only an accept-
able, ancillary effect of the Court's decision. I believe they had a
different motivation for finding in favor of the Hawaiian
legislation.
Because these first two reasons acted as added incentives to
approve the Hawaiian takings, the majority was able to use this
case as a vehicle to promote its economic and political ideology.
By doing this in a case in which the result seems incompatible with
the majority's philosophy, the majority was better able to disguise
the political nature of its decision. The Court presented the result
in a manner that is unlikely to be duplicated, but the rule it pro-
vided fosters the majority's political inclinations and applies to a
multitude of situations. Of course, the majority structured the
opinion so that it appears compelled by legal rules. The irony is
that a decision like Hawaii Housing Authority can ultimately be
unanimous. Since at first blush the result seems contrary to the
majority's ordinary leanings, it is likely (or possible) that it is a
result compatible with the usual dissenters' philosophies and polit-
ics. Those holding minority views on the Court may have ap-
proved this result because they actually believe in dismantling oli-
gopolies and/or redistributing wealth or land to the poor or
many. By couching the opinion in terms of disrupting oligopolies,
and agreeing to a result that appeared to be redistributive, Justice
O'Connor was able to get their assent. (How could they dissent to
the decision if they approved of the scheme)? The majority made
certain, however, that the results would be limited by their em-
phasis on the uniqueness of the Hawaiian situtation. In the
meantime, the case gave them a perfect opportunity to promote a
rule that would have a political effect they desired. This third rea-
son for deciding Hawaii Housing Authority in this fashion is by far
the most shrewd. It is also purely speculative. This is how I envi-
sion the underlying rationale; perhaps because it sparks the flames
of my "mastermind" theory of judicial opinion writing.
To reiterate, as applied to Hawaii Housing Authority, the ma-
jority, who would ordinarily be ill-disposed to permit the transfer
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of land from the wealthy few to the many, 12 did just that, and
attributed its decision to compelled compliance with constitutional
doctrine. In this fashion, the Court gave its sub silentio approval to
the kind of private transfers that occur in cases such as Poletown.
The Hawaii Housing Authority decision could have been written as
the appeal from Poletown. As did the Michigan majority in
Poletown, it required deference to the legislature, 13 collapsed the
concept of public use into public purpose, and approved compul-
sory transfers between private entities. What the United States Su-
preme Court may have done is disguise within the confines of an
unlikely case a rule that permits an economically dominant and
politically powerful private enterprise to coerce a manipulable
government into using its eminent domain power for the firm's
benefit. It may then acquire private property for its own use and
profit with incidental, if any real, benefits to portions of the pub-
lic. A broad definition of "public use" has historically benefited
private business and economic development rather than the less
politically or economically powerful groups.3 1 4
The advantage to the Court of deciding a case with a factual
setting such as that in Hawaii Housing Authority, as opposed to that
in Poletown, vas that it could avoid the more complicated issue of
whether there are certain property interests (like community) that
should be inalienable, or privileged and protected by stricter stan-
dards for takings. 15 Moreover, by deciding the Hawaii Housing
Authority case instead of one like Poletown, the Court could avoid
the more politically and morally sensitive issues of dislocating peo-
ple from their homes and community, thereby destroying a dis-
crete ethnic, racial or socio-economic community. The rule that a
legislative determination of public use/purpose in the context of
an eminent domain transfer to a private party is sacrosanct is now
312. Of course, as explained above, this was only a select group of "the many," and
hence more palatable to our conservative judiciary in the Supreme Court.
313. The Michigan Supreme Court allegedly required a heightened scrutiny of the
legislative determination, but as the dissenting Justices and some commentators noted, it
was heightened in name only and not in reality or effect.
314. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text for an illustration of how the
broadened concept of public use enlarged the coffers of private mills, railroads and utilities
in the past. See supra notes 146-66 and accompanying text for an explanation of how pri-
vate developers were enriched by urban redevelopment plans in the name of a broad pub-
lic use principle. Is Poletown at all different when viewed in this historical perspective?
315. See infra text accompanying notes 319-36.
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firmly entrenched, so the Court can avoid taking Poletown-type ap-
peals to make that point, while artfully avoiding the more difficult
social, economic, political and moral issues. Hawaii Housing Author-
ity was a safe case to decide, in that people did not have to be
uprooted from their homes, and no real economic or social redis-
tribution occurred (only a market failure was corrected). This
clever approach to constitutional decisionmaking, where a judge
writes an opinion that has an unsympathetic result in the case sub
judice in order to promote a rule that furthers the dominant polit-
ical ideology in most other cases, is what underlies my so-called
"mastermind theory."31
VI. POLETOWN VERSUS HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY
What is the confluence of Poletown and Hawaii Housing Author-
ity? Where do their courses diverge? Can these cases be distin-
guished, or must both exist if one exists? If -they must exist to-
gether or not at all, is it better to have both or neither?
While Hawaii Housing Authority did not specifically proclaim
that redistribution from the wealthy to the poor is a "public use/
purpose," it theoretically supported a legislative program
designed to achieve that end.31  I would like to think that our
Constitution has room for this type of legislatively-sanctioned so-
cial and economic reorganization. 18 Minimally, in order to
316. See, for example, the discussion of Justice Holmes' strategy in Pennsylvania Coal,
supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text; see also Justice Rehnquist's approach in
PruneYard, supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text. This was the same technique used
by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), where he denied
his Court's jurisdiction to decide the case before him in order to promote his theory of the
supreme authority of the Court to review the constitutionality of legislation. If the Court
does something that appears humbling or admits to a lack of power or takes what appears
to be a stance that is contrary to one's expectations based on the Justice's or Justices' views
as expressed in other opinions, it is reasonable to question what further benefit is derived
from that posture. In many cases that particular stance or acquiescence may be a disguise
for promoting a subtler political-social-economic philosophy that mimics the Court's and
society's dominant ideology and political power structure.
317. Under Hawaii Housing Authority it would probably be necessary to argue that the
situation was highly unique (like Hawaii's feudal tenure system) and that it served a public
purpose other than pure redistribution (like oligopoly).
318. As an aside, I would like to elaborate on the genesis of this Article. After first
reading Hawaii Housing Authority in U.S. Law Week, it was my original intention to argue
for the legitimacy of extending the Hawaii Housing Authority rule to a similar system of
oligopolistic land control in West Virginia and Appalachia generally. By employing analo-
gous provisions, I hoped to argue that the West Virginia legislature could draft legislation
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achieve this result, a court would have to employ a rule of total
deference to state and local legislative determinations, as in Ha-
waii Housing Authority. Yet, that same rule of unquestioning defer-
ence justifies economic reorderings from the many to the few,
that returned previously severed subsurface mineral rights to the surface owners who re-
sided on the property. Such a scheme would conform to the Hawaii Housing Authority re-
quirements so long as the legislature could justify the property transfer as having a public
purpose or producing a public benefit. In addition to the readily available oligopoly argu-
ment, an argument could be constructed based on another kind of market failure, which
has produced West Virginia's severe poverty, and has been exacerbated by foreign and
corporate ownership of state mineral resources: just as alleviating severe unemployment
was a "public use" in Poletown, alleviating severe poverty would be a "public use" in West
Virginia. (I am not convinced that this is a good argument, probably because of my reluc-
tance to rely on any of Poletown's reasoning). But, if one sticks to the Hawaii Housing Au-
thority logic, this plan would be legally defensible.
Financing the arrangement might be more difficult than passing constitutional scrutiny,
but as in Hawaii, a fund could be established that would loan up to 90 or 95% of the
purchase price to the surface owners. I would think West Virginians would be supportive
of a bond issue for that purpose. The surface owners, who by this legislation would be
entitled to purchase the mineral rights underneath their surface, would be free, within
environmental and legislative constraints, to lease (under more equitable terms and shorter
duration leases) their subsurface mineral resources to interested parties at competitive mar-
ket prices. If they did not conserve or use their mineral resources themselves, the leasing
fees would enable them to make their mortgage payments. According to Hawaii Housing
Authority, this would seem to be a constitutionally supportable means to rectify some of the
grave inequalities of wealth and inequities of distribution in current Appalachian mineral
holdings.
While I doubted that this is the sort of arrangement that would meet with the United
States Supreme Court majority's visions of takings law, it would be consistent with the
Hawaii Housing Authority rationale. This rationale would also appear to leave room for
transfers of run-away or faltering businesses to employees. In a Poletown-type situation, it
would justify the state's taking a failing business that has oligopolistic control over the job
market, more so than the converse in which the oligopolist takes homes and a community
to maintain its control over the market and local employment.
The potential for redistribution from the few or wealthy to the many or needy is re-
markable under the Hawaii Housing Authority rationale, assuming that courts do not repeat-
edly use its language about the unique character of the Hawaii landholding system to dis-
tinguish it. The problems would then involve financial or economic impediments, not
constitutional ones. On its face this seems a constitutional precedent worth preserving and
utilizing for these ends.
Since my initial fascination with its possibilities, however, I have become disenchanted
with the obvious manipulation of constitutional principles that brought about the Hawaii
Housing Authority result. If the integrity of constitutional doctrine is so easily disposed of,
then it seems best to use that decision in this manner to politically and economically em-
power the masses. While a denunciation of the Hawaii Housing Authority rule for its lack of
consistency with inherent and fundamental constitutional principles might jeopardize the
probability of achieving such highly desirable results, it may ultimately benefit those same
people by reducing the degree of control of constitutional processes now in the hands of
the economically and politically powerful minority.
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from the disempowered to the powerful, from individuals to cor-
porations, as happened in Poletown. I would like to think that our
constitutional law protects against this sort of government-im-
posed property transfer. Is this asking to have one's cake and eat
it too? How can the Hawaii Housing Authority opinion exist without
also sanctioning the Poletown result? Is there something about one
"taking" as opposed to the other that truly offends our constitu-
tional principles? Or do any conceivable distinctions place form
over substance, create technical distinctions without actual differ-
ences, and use legal wordplay for political ends?
A. Nature of the Property Interest.
One means of distinguishing Poletown from Hawaii Housing
Authority is to redefine the nature of the property interest pro-
tected by the eminent domain clause, and exempt from that clause
certain "property" interests that are incapable of being justly
compensated. Professor Margaret Radin analyzed the feasibility
and legitimacy of a distinction between fungible property and per-
sonal property, as defined by their relationship to personhood.31
Part of the way in which human beings assert their autonomy and
project their personality is through their relationships with
"things" or property.820 Property connected to personhood is
property that develops and defines an individual's autonomy or
personality. 21 Her theory holds that fungible property rights,
319. Radin, supra note 25, at 986. Professor Radin noted that this distinction is similar
to C. Edwin Baker's dichotomy between valuing activities for their extrinsic, instrumental
effect and/or their intrinsic, substantive character. Id. at 986 n.102.
Other authors have dichotomized property rights. Professor Carol Rose noted two di-
vergent purposes for property: acquisitive, for wealth and strength, and political, for inde-
pendence and participation. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Mud-
dle, 57 S. CAL L. REV. 561 (1984). Professor Charles Donahue spoke of property for
security and property for power. Donahue, The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted
From Its Past, 22 NoMos 28 (1980). Karl Polyani wrote about property for production and
property for consumption. K. POLYANI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMA'nON (1944). Morris Cohen
divided property into property for power and property for use. M. COHEN, LAW AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER 41-68 (1933). Karl Marx is reknowned for his distinction between property
for use and property for exchange, as measured by its value.
320. Professor Radin borrows heavily from Hegel for this analysis. Radin, supra note
25, at 991-1013.
321. Property so defined, if intimately related to personhood, may be so unique and
personal that it can never be subject to compulsory transfer. Some property could be so
"special" that its status or definition removes it from any prospect of government expropri-
ation. Property can be viewed as a continuum from intimately personal things to fungible
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such as investment interests that can be easily converted into dol-
lar amounts, may be more readily "taken" than personal property
rights which directly integrate the personality and autonomy of
the person with the "thing" or object that is the subject of a dis-
puted "taking." She first explained this theory by using illustra-
tions such as a wedding ring or photograph that has enormous
personal value to the owner, but little or no comparable exchange
value on a market. A wedding ring to its owner is irreplaceable; to
the store owner who sells wedding rings for a living, its loss is
easily compensable in money. This reasoning applies to the tak-
ings clause as follows: a property right or interest in one's home,
residence, community or neighborhood should be given clear hi-
erarchical preference (greater protection from infringement or
loss) over ownership of rental property for investment purposes.
Investments are fungible because they are less clearly connected
with personhood, can fairly be converted into money, and hence
are capable of being justly compensated. This hierarchy results in
the priority of a tenant's right of possession over a landlord's in-
vestment-ownership right when they come in conflict, because a
tenant's property right to possession is more closely related to the
tenant's personhood than a landlord's ownership rights in the resi-
dential property leased to that tenant. 22
Analogously, this fungible/personal property rights dichot-
omy works well in justifying different results in Hawaii Housing
Authority, and Poletown. In Poletown people were forced to relin-
quish their homes and community, property interests most closely
aligned with personhood that are of the highest order on the con-
tinuum between personal and fungible property. Radin suggests
that some items or objects, such as these, "may be so close to the
personal end of the continuum that no compensation could be
'just.' "323 In Hawaii Housing Authority, however, landowners were
investments for profits only. As property moves from one end of the continuum to the
other, it should be less protected from governmental interference or conflicting private
claims. Id. at 1014-15.
322. Radin, supra note 25, at 995-96, explained that Professor Ackerman's defense of
the imposition of a warranty of habitability on residential tenancies conforms with the ar-
gument that private law ordering should not permit fungible property rights to prevail
over personal property rights that implicate personhood notions of autonomy and self-
definition.
323. Id. at 1005. She acknowledged that this has not been accepted as a viable theory
for an implied limitation on eminent domain takings, but she alluded to some instances
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not severed from their residential property or communities at all.
The property subject to eminent domain condemnation was prop-
erty held for investment purposes that was fungible in terms of
wealth. 2' Fungible property, held for investment or wealth pur-
poses, by this account is not immune from exercises of eminent
domain power.3 25
where group property rights were given enhanced protection. Id. at 1006. Her primary
reference is to Native American group claims to territory, but her argument would be
equally useful for a community such as Poletown, defined by its ethnicity or even by its
community-group cohesion.
While I like the theme of Professor Radin's theory, and the idea of dividing property
rights in terms of their tangible and intangible values, I find it difficult to apply in most
cases. There are the extreme examples of the business tycoon who derives her personal
identity from the business she built from scratch and the millionaire who defines herself in
terms of her 50-room castle on a 500 acre estate. There is the question of what to do about
the holdout who refuses to sell a lifelong home that is blocking a necessary interstate route.
I do not know how to resolve these hypotheticals under her model.
I believe that her theory is most powerful in terms of community or group rights be-
cause they are of a different nature than even personal property rights of the highest or-
der. In either case, it is the intangible aspect or value that enhances the required protec-
tion, but unlike a home or a wedding ring or an apartment, a community or group does
not have any real tangible element. Communities tend to be connected to places, so that
divorcing them from place can leave them physically unable to maintain their cohesion; but
the sense, bond and affection of community, and the sense of self-identity that comes from
it, is not the place itself and contains no physical component. It can never be replaced by
any physical thing (money or otherwise). Because community is virtually irreplaceable, and
indistinguishably bound up with identity, it should never be sacrificed for property inter-
ests of any order. If its existence is dependent upon property rights, then those property
rights must be preserved to preserve this other value called community.
This analysis takes community out of the realm of property interests entirely and places
it on a higher plane. It is different from Professor Radin's theory, because she always works
within the property concept; but it is also similar in that it focuses on something (in this
case an intangible) that is constitutive of a person's identity. That constitutive sense of
community is the framework of communitarian analyses. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LImrrs oF JUSTICE (1982). When I apply her analysis to Poletown and Hawaii Hous-
ing Authority, see infra text accompanying note 324, I shall apply it to the "community"
property interest, rather than the specific personal interests in one's home.
324. It is arguable that the owners defined themselves with respect to the power they
maintained through their huge landholdings, so that their ownership of this investment
property was intimately connected with their personal autonomy and self-definition. That
argument can be countered by the rationale that if wealth is the source of their power, just
compensation adequately replaces this wealth-loss (of land) with another comparable source
of wealth (money), so that their personal power is not diminished. This case seems more
easily reconciliable with Radin's theory than the ones of the self-made millionaire and busi-
ness tycoon, above. See supra note 323.
325. Professor Radin discussed this distinction of wealth-loss versus object-loss in re-
spect to Professor Bruce Ackerman's PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 112-67
(1977). Ackerman argued that courts are more likely to protect a layman's concept of
property as represented in discrete objects than property as defined as net worth.
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Professor Radin further established a hierarchy of personal
property interests: personal property connected to one's auton-
omy, personhood, or group identity has a prima facie preference
against any form of government interference (eminent domain,
due process, fourth amendment) or against cancellation by con-
flicting fungible property rights. Even personhood interests that
are not embodied in property should have prima facie priority
over fungible property rights that conflict with them. 26
In some ways Professor Frank Michelman acknowledged this
personhood interest in his seminal 1967 article about just com-
pensation, but he disguised it in economic, utilitarian and fairness
language.3 27 Michelman framed his argument in terms of a utilita-
rian calculus that placed great weight on "demoralization costs":
[these costs] are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset
disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the
realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized
dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives
or social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their
sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they them-
selves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion.3 28
For those things in which we have our identities most in-
vested, like a community, the ability of society to adequately com-
pensate for such a loss may be so far-fetched or non-existent that
326. Professor William Rodgers established a "tripartite conception of property"
where the highest level personal property interests of Professor Radin are called "core
'human' property interests" and may not be taken except by the owner's consent; an inter-
mediate level of fungible property interest may be taken if compensation is paid; and social
property in the resource commons which belongs to the community may be redefined to
the owner's detriment without compensation. Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Toward A Com-
prehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 EcoLOGY L.Q. 205, 230 (1982). His
social property classification is similar to ideas articulated by Professor Sax. See infra text
accompanying notes 333-36.
327. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
328. Id. at 1215. Professor Michelman summarizes:
In sum, we must remember that the utilitarian's solicitude for security is instru-
mental and subordinate to his goal of maximizing the output of satisfactions.
Security of expectation is cherished, not for its own sake, but only as a shield
for morale. [One must] admit that not all capricious redistributive effects are
totally demoralizing, and utilitarian theory can tell us where to draw the line
between compensable and noncompensable collective impositions. An imposi-
tion is compensable if not to compensate would be critically demoralizing, other-
wise, not.
Id. at 1213 (emphasis added).
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demoralization costs will always significantly outweigh the other
factors in an eminent domain calculation. It is undoubtedly de-
moralizing to realize that one's community, an intangible associa-
tion that is constitutive of self-identity, can be sacrificed for the
profit of a multi-billion dollar private corporation whenever that
corporation finds a government that is vulnerable because of high
unemployment or recession. Thus, the demoralization of
Poletown residents and their sympathizers, such as Ralph Nader's
groups and those moved by the media accounts, may prohibit an
exercise of eminent domain, 29 whereas the Hawaii Housing Au-
thority case is less likely to evoke such a demoralizing attitude in
the general populace or even among those whose property is
taken.330
I clearly recognize the gravity of the economic plight that had
befallen Detroit and much of the nation in the early 1980's. I do
not mean to suggest that nothing could be done requiring sacri-
fices from Detroit or Hamtramck citizens to ameliorate the seri-
ous dilemma within the region. I only suggest that the taking of a
community, and its equation with fungible or real estate property
interests as if it were freely exchangeable for money, and the giv-
ing of it to a private business (to let it increase its slipping profits
and maintain its control and power over the labor market) seems
unbalanced and demoralizing. There certainly were other possible
solutions. If demoralization costs are a good measure, it may have
329. There is no doubt that loss of job may have an equally devastating effect on self-
identity. Loss of community and loss of job should be equally protected against eminent
domain. It has been argued to me that if the community had not been taken, jobs would
have been lost and the result would have been that the same people would have lost their
homes and community. That is possible. It is also possible that alternative solutions could
have been reached. So long as our law is construed as leaving the option available to sacri-
fice community for private business' promises of jobs, there is little incentive to explore less
"demoralizing" options.
330. But see Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097
(1981), wherein he argued that the fault with the Poletown decision, if any, was a "process"-
based fault. Because Michelman equated the right to property with a political right (in
many ways analogous to the arguments of the Greeks and early republicans, see supra notes
63-73 and accompanying text), the taking of the Poletown residents' property rights might
have effected a taking of their political power rights. Accord Michelman, Process and Prop-
erty in Constitutional Theory, 30 CLav. ST. L. REV. 577 (1982). The impropriety of the taking
to Michelman was not how it affected a utilitarian calculus containing a demoralization
factor, but in its disenfranchising impact. For a further discussion about the "civic prop-
erty" tradition that views property as a source of political empowerment, see Rose, supra
note 319.
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been less demoralizing (and more efficient) to condemn GM's
property and give it to Detroit citizens. 3 ' If the personal/fungible
property distinction is meritorious, the latter suggestion would
also be more appropriate. The rights that the city of Detroit chose
to infringe were those closest to personhood and self-identity.
There were lower order rights that could have been sacrificed
instead.332
After years of study, Professor Sax has reworked his theories
about eminent domain by redefining property interests that are
eligible for heightened protection under the takings and due pro-
cess clauses. 333 In Sax II he promoted the concept of spillover ef-
fects to delimit proper governmental authority to regulate private
property ownership and use, and he included in the definition of
constitutionally protected property the public's equally weighty in-
terests in all land uses that have extraterritorial effects. In Sax III
he discussed expanded notions of property protected by the tak-
ings clause. He viewed the most recent developments in property
law as representative of a change in values from exclusive (pri-
vate), developmental property rights to non-exclusive (public,
community), preservation property interests. Over the years, ex-
pectations and values in society have changed. Professor Sax con-
cluded that there is now a concentrated focus on community val-
ues, neighborhoods, open spaces, environmental purity and
aesthetics, and historic, wildlife and nature preservation. We now
understand how the old system, which focused on development,
misallocated land rights and benefits. As a society, we have
learned that the costs associated with further development in-
331. If Detroit could amass the $200 million necessary to condemn and clear the land
for GM, it could have found alternative means to remedy the unemployment problems.
Why could it not have required GM to build elsewhere (where business or investment prop-
erty was sacrificed instead of community), or to build vertically instead of horizontally (so
as not to have to destroy a whole community)? Why did it unquestioningly accept GM's
criteria? Why were the pleas and protests of the community unpersuasive? Why didn't De-
troit construct a plant itself, or purchase a business to employ its citizens? Who participated
in these decisions?
332. It appears that instead of evaluating the hierarchy of property interests and
choosing to interfere with the lowest, Detroit and GM evaluated the hierarchy of political
power and economic rank, and chose to interfere with the lowest. The problem is the
hierarchies are not interchangeable. The propriety of choosing the lowest from one model
does not equate with the propriety of choosing the lowest from the other.
333. See the evolution of his theories in Sax I and Sax II, supra note 23, and Sax III,
supra note 25.
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crease at a greater pace than the benefits it bestows on the public.
These lessons have taught us, Professor Sax argued, that property
rights and interests must emphasize social coherence, neighbor-
hood character, and community stability. Instead of using eminent
domain to promote private economic development, we must use it
to benefit community and environmental interests.
Developmental property rights should increasingly yield to
these community values and interests. An analogy can be made to
Professor Radin's personal/fungible property dichotomy. Com-
munity and personal property should be protected from being
taken and given the highest hierarchical value. The barriers to
destroying community stability or character should be formidable
compared with the barriers to destroying fungible investment in-
terests.3 3 4 Our society's values have matured to recognize that
neighborhood, community, security, safety and nature are non-
convertible into money. There is no just compensation for their
loss. Therefore a clause that permits the taking of property if just
compensation is paid cannot apply to them. The "property" sim-
ply cannot be taken.
Professor Sax acknowledged that Poletown was an exception to
this trend,3 5 but argued that the course of noncompensation for
withdrawn development rights illustrates a fundamental redefini-
tion of property to public from private. If his insights are applied
to situations like Poletown and Hawaii Housing Authority, it is likely
that GM would not have prevailed over community values in
Poletown, but the community associations would have prevailed
over the remaining landed aristocracy in Hawaii. His theory is up-
lifting, but it does not seem to comport with the Supreme Court's
articulated views in recent takings versus regulation cases. Rather,
Justice Rehnquist's "money empowers" theory of what constitutes
protectible property, which focuses on investments, profits and
wealth-loss, 3 6 seems to predominate.
334. It is my opinion that they should be insurmountable unless the community coher-
ence is based on or rooted in a discriminatory animus (racist or classist) that does not rec-
ognize all peoples' equality.
335. Sax III, supra note 25, at 489.
336. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), where
Rehnquist joined the majority decision.
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B. Standard of Review.
The first approach to achieving favorable results in Hawaii
Housing Authority, while disallowing the GM taking in Poletown, is
redefining what type of property can be taken by eminent do-
main. A second means of reconciling the Hawaii Housing Authority
situation with Poletown, so that a taking would be permissible in
the first instance but not in the second, is to alter the standard of
review depending upon the "fundamental" nature of the property
interest or to heighten the review of legislative determinations of
"public use." Because "public use" is a special, constitutionally ex-
pressed limitation on the eminent domain power, it should not be
relegated to the same standard of review as the due process
clause. Rational basis review, which is the standard due process
review of legislation, is inadequate where legislation infringes
upon a right that has special constitutional status. The Court em-
ploys a heightened scrutiny for discriminations based on race,
gender, legitimacy or alienage; for legislation that affects free
speech or free exercise of religious rights; for privacy rights,
rights of marriage, reproduction or bodily autonomy and for
other "fundamental rights." Confusion arises about whether
heightened review should accompany certain property rights, as
fundamental rights, or whether it should accompany the public
use determination, as a constitutionally imposed limitation on emi-
nent domain. Several commentators have recommended an inten-
sified scrutiny by courts where private property rights are taken
or regulated.3
337. They represent a spectrum of perspectives from libertarian to communitarian
and the radical left. See generally Epstein, supra note 15 (seeks more serious scrutiny of the
public use issue by courts; admonishes courts for equating public use and public purpose
and then looking for indirect benefits); Epstein, The Public Purpose Limitation on the Power of
Eminent Dqmain: A Constitutional Liberty Under Attack, 4 PACE L. REv. 231 (1984) (recom-
mends vigilant enforcement of constitutional barriers against overreaching exercises of em-
inent domain as a result of his disapproval of Poletown); Lewis, supra note 27, at 929 ("[i]f
the legal realm, when confronted by such [economic] necessity, lacks clear standards and
values, then it risks serving as little more than a legitimatizing agency offering ex post facto
sanctioning to the agents of corporate power and prerogative"); Mansnerus, supra note 15
(full rationality review with objective standards and a full factual hearing); McFarlane,
supra note 29 (argues for a substantive due process approach that analyzes the rationality
of the means of achieving the public purpose and does a substantive fairness balance); Mei-
dinger, supra note 27 (posits a strict public benefit test, requiring proof that the improve-
ment will enlarge the pie, that the taking is necessary to carry out a public purpose and
that under a stringent cost-benefit analysis there is greater public good than private injury);
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The Poletown majority in its per curiam opinion claimed that
it gave closer scrutiny to the GM transfer because the direct trans-
feree was a private business. It is hard to imagine what that
heightened scrutiny consisted of, as noted by both dissenting jus-
tices. If that is an example of strict or even middle-tier scrutiny,
and it can be accomplished without an enumeration of the factors
that the Court considered or an explanation of how they were bal-
anced or resolved, then it is apparent that heightened scrutiny
leaves the judiciary with the same free hand as mere rational basis
review to legitimate dominant, economic power values. Closer
scrutiny is supposed to provide additional protection to rights or
values that might otherwise be vulnerable to majoritarian tyranny.
In Poletown, it was only a justificatory label for acquiescing to an-
other equally pernicious tyranny, the tyranny of economic class
power. The majority opinion did not mention whether public use
required any degree of public control. It accepted the legislative
declaration that there would be a benefit in the form of increased
employment without any analysis of the relationship between the
harm to the sacrificed community members and the benefit to the
public at large; the degree of benefit to the public compared to
the required expenditure of public funds; the number of actual
jobs saved; the real, primary beneficiary of the land transfer; or
alternative and less intrusive means of achieving the desired ef-
fect. It is difficult to understand what the Court meant when it
stated that it performed a more careful review of this transfer
than others.
Applying strict scrutiny to reclassified or redefined property
rights may be a more valuable approach. "Community" could be
declared a fundamental right, so that any government action that
discriminated against or harmed a community would have to be
carefully scrutinized. Any time a taking detrimentally affects other
public or social rights, such as health, safety or preservation of the
environment, courts should also scrutinize it more closely.Takings
Oakes, supra note 29 (courts must give substantive due process protection to certain prop-
erty rights that represent the personhood, liberty, social and public interests-these rights
deserve judicial review and to not give review is a choice); Schwartz, supra note 27 (recom-
mends that courts take a closer look at the necessity requirement of "public use" and that
they require public control); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980) (notes that many writers have recommended solving the takings
problems by legislative action, but that takings are problems for the courts which must set
minimum standards of what constitutes permissible transfers).
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of investment property, since it is fungible and monetarily com-
pensable, might only be entitled to rationality review. In such
cases, great deference to the legislature might be appropriate. A
final approach would be to use different standards of review for
takings where the government is the transferee from those where
there is a private transferee.338 Transfer to private parties should
require a stricter standard of review, that is, more intense judicial
evaluation.
In any case, when the Supreme Court decided upon the ap-
propriate level of review for takings in Hawaii Housing Authority, it
gave seemingly absolute deference to legislative judgments. As the
law now stands, a state legislature is free to find a public use or
purpose in private transfers from the few to the many or the
many to the few; from the rich to the poor or the poor to the
rich; from a person to a corporation or a corporation to a person;
and from fungible, investment property to personal property or
personal property to investment, development property. The pub-
lic need not benefit directly. It does not even have to be a major
beneficiary of the forced property transfer.
When a court abstains from critically examining a taking, it
renders the "public use" language in the fifth amendment mean-
ingless. "Public use" would only mean that an eminent domain
exercise is legislatively sanctioned. Yet, we all know from other
areas of law that legislatures do not always act constitutionally.
Their powers are not limitless, and sometimes they exceed them
or act in a manner that unconstitutionally infringes on other
rights. They are subject to intense, immediate political influences.
The distanced and unpressured reflection that courts can lend to
the process may reveal that a particular legislative action is pro-
hibited by constitutional values or principles. But under the low-
ered Hawaii Housing Authority standard of review, the powerful
can create "public uses" through effective legislative and political
lobbying, assuming that the legislature is the only judge.339 The
poor, disenfranchised or underrepresented communities may have
338. For discussions of this type of distinction, see Ross, Transferring Land to Private
Entities by the Power of Eminent Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 355 (1983); Sax I, supra note
23.
339. Even though judges are often motivated by similar types of political allegiances,
they clearly have a better opportunity for a deliberate, considered weighing of all sides
than do legislators.
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their property taken because they do not have meaningful access
to the political processes.3 40
C. Redefining "Public Use".
Public use has been variously defined over time to accommo-
date different goals." 1 The definition was expanded whenever it
was necessary to promote economic development or business in-
terests of the most politically powerful groups. The Supreme
Court in Hawaii Housing Authority failed to narrow this definition.
As a result, public use may now signify an enormously broad spec-
trum of acceptable activities. Perhaps the most effective approach
to creating a constitutional takings theory that would permit a
transfer like the one in Hawaii Housing Authority and prohibit a
transfer like the one in Poletown is to clearly and unmistakably
redefine public use. Public use should mean public access or con-
trol; it should mean that when property is involuntarily trans-
ferred, the public (or a greater number of people, not corpora-
tions or business interests) acquires greater rights or interests in
the property than it had before the transfer. Indirect or conse-
quential benefit to the public cannot meet this public use defini-
tion. All transfers to private businesses, corporations or develop-
ers would fail. Private enterprises would have to find other ways
to acquire and assemble land. If the government chose to finance
or underwrite these activities, it would have to employ different
means. A "public use" definition that permitted the government
to tear down neighborhoods for urban redevelopment would con-
travene this constitutional limitation. If the public desires the ben-
efits of such changes, it would have to make such a commitment
itself. It cannot pass the task to private developers, who reap prof-
its while using public eminent domain power to assemble prop-
erty, and government-backed, low interest loans to finance their
private enterprises. In the same way, if the public needed to retain
and create jobs, it could not feed GM carrots in hopes that it will
ultimately offer some employment to local citizens. Public use
must mean public access and control. It necessarily involves trans-
fers from the few to the many; from the wealthy -to the less
340. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. Lj. 223
(1981).
341. See supra notes 74-103 and accompanying text.
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wealthy or poor or needy. It cannot mean the reverse. This redef-
inition of public use would still permit the Hawaii Housing Author-
ity redistribution, but would prevent another Poletown from
happening.
D. Barring All Private Transferees.
Finally, a takings problem could be solved by barring all exer-
cises of eminent domain in favor of private transferees. Certainly
this is a feasible result, and it adheres to a literal reading of the
takings clause. This approach may even be preferable, though it
makes Hawaii-type land redistributions impossible under the tak-
ings clause. In the long run, it may be better to make such a sacri-
fice, than to permit more community destructions like Poletown
under a rule that freely permits both takings.
VII. CONCLUSION
The takings clause, embedded in the fifth amendment, is ex-
tremely complicated. Its underlying principles, its meaning, its re-
quirements and what it empowers the government to do have
been the subjects of debate for the last 150 years. Its application is
ultimately and directly related to value systems, and the integra-
tion of those values in our constitutional scheme. Of more import
today, however, the clause's application is tied to principles and
politics. If our Constitution is to have any meaning beyond politi-
cal expediency, it must contain some unbending principles expres-
sing a hierarchy of values. The highest values must be affirma-
tively preserved and protected by the government from public
and/or private encroachments. For constitutionally-enshrined val-
ues of a lower order, the government may only have a duty to
refrain from their violation or infringement. In whatever fashion
they are ranked or treated, however, constitutional values en-
sconced in constitutional principles must be above political whims
or fancies.
If an interpretation of the takings clause is wholly dependent
upon the immediate social, economic, or political visions of legisla-
tures or judges, then it has no internal, inviolable constitutional
principles' or value structure. This is the major source of confu-
sion in takings jurisprudence. Leaving interpretations of the tak-
ings clause to manipulation by localized political temperaments
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has permitted highly contradictory results like the Poletown and
Hawaii Housing Authority cases. Those results may occur anyway in
our political society, but they should not be legitimated by the tak-
ings clause.
Social and economic questions are inherently political. This
was the lesson of the Lochner era. Political questions belong to leg-
islatures. Legislatures have an arena in which to debate appropri-
ate solutions, get continuous public input, seek expert advice, in-
vestigate alternatives and design new programs. Legislative
powers to remedy or solve political dilemmas are broad, but not
limitless. They are "trumped" by constitutional principles and val-
ues that may not be encroached in the process of finding solu-
tions. Certain means of ameliorating problems are prohibited. For
instance, a legislature cannot decide to remedy problems of the
homeless by jailing them or confining them in state mental health
institutions. It cannot eliminate crime by executing all criminals
or even all repeat offenders. These limits exist because our Consti-
tution values life and liberty over political expediency. This mo-
tion is partially derived from the substance of the due process
clause, and partially from the "penumbras" that implement core
constitutional values. In the same way, our constitutional princi-
ples put limits on what the legislature may do to remedy problems
of unemployment or market failure in wealth distribution. If
those limits are in the Constitution, they are in the same place as
the other limits-the due process clause and the ordered liberty
created by the Constitution as a whole. The principles include a
republican respect for individual autonomy and community cohe-
sion. All constitutional clauses must be interpreted in light of
those principles and values. In this sense, the protections against
unfair encroachments on property are identical to protections of
life and liberty. They are to be judged from a perspective of con-
stitutional values and not political expediency.
Cases like Poletown and Hawaii Housing Authority represent a
recent movement toward aggressive use of eminent domain power
to remedy social and economic problems. This trend began with
the Berman-style urban redevelopment cases. The takings clause,
however, was not designed for these ends. Such political questions
must be decided by legislatures and then ultimately tested in
courts, if challenged, to see if the legislatures have transgressed
inviolable constitutional principles. Eminent domain has different
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historical and ideological roots. It was and is a logistical tool by
which a government can make necessary property adjustments so
that it, as the representative of the people, can proceed in serving
them in its governmental capacity. It was originally used by gov-
ernments to take land to build roads and construct government
buildings. It does not ask how property rights should be defined,
which ones should be protected, under what circumstances they
may be taken, or how far a regulation may go. It encompasses one
constitutional principle-just distribution of the costs of public
projects-so that when the government requires a citizen to trans-
fer to the government total ownership and control of her specific,
named property which has been deemed uniquely necessary for a
public project, that citizen shall be justly compensated for her loss.
By requiring compensation from government funds, the takings
clause transfers the costs of the project from the single property
owner to all citizens equitably. That was its purpose and that
should be its sole use.
Now, however, the takings clause is used to take land for pri-
vate businesses (not for government use) or for public redistribu-
tion. Whether or not these ends are laudatory, they should have
nothing to do with the takings clause. I have concluded that the
takings clause has been violently distorted and misused. Neither
Hawaii Housing Authority nor Poletown belongs within its reach. My
recommendation is that the takings clause should be restricted to
a small variety of cases in which the government acquires real
property ownership, possession or full control (restrictions on use
would never be takings) for government projects that service the
public.3 42 In only those cases is the government constitutionally
permitted to acquire property, and thereby required to provide
just compensation. Other cases that test other constitutional val-
ues and principles may be appropriately evaluated under the due
process clause or other constitutional clauses, but should not be
framed in terms of takings questions and should not rely on the
clause's limited language. By placing political questions in the tak-
ings clause where they do not belong, courts have distorted it be-
342. For cases where government action causes or is responsible for destruction of
private property (e.g., flooding cases), private law civil remedies should be available. These
are tort and nuisance cases, not constitutional takings cases. Problems of sovereign immu-
nity barriers to recovery need to be solved through other mechanisms than the takings
clause.
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yond comprehension. They have made the word "take" seem to
include "restrict, .... deprive" or "regulate"; they have made the
phrase "public use" mean "private use with incidental public ef-
fects" or "transfers to private individuals." Such distortions of
constitutional clauses make the Constitution appear to have no
core meaning or value structure; it becomes a mere toy for politi-
cians. Efforts should be made to dispel this effect. One small step
would be to bring the takings clause back within its reasonable
semantic limits.
Whether or not the Constitution, under other provisions, per-
mits or prohibits the results reached in Poletown or Hawaii Housing
Authority, neither outcome should be decided by reference to the
takings clause. Political solutions to economic and social problems
involve value judgments that are not part of this clause. Takings
clause challenges to those solutions should be dismissed by the
courts. Political remedies for economic and social ills can only be
successfully challenged if they infringe upon fundamental consti-
tutional values or principles-only then may a court intervene. In
those cases legislative actions must be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny, because constitutional values may not be sacrificed for
immediate political results. If no fundamental rights or values are
involved, then a rational basis analysis may be sufficient. But the
takings clause is not involved in these questions at all. The takings
clause should not be an issue in any case unless the government
transferred private property to itself for the service of its citizens.
If we want the Constitution to maintain our respect, we must
treat it respectfully. We must affirm its core principles and value
system. We must not distort its phrases so their meanings seem no
more than lawyers' play or politicians' whims; we must not allow
political consequences to occur without regard to their effects on
fundamental rights. It might ultimately turn out that a change of
approach in constitutional analysis would create no real difference
in results. I hope that would not be the case. But even if it were, a
change in patterns of constitutional interpretation that would re-
store the Constitution to its rightful place as a meaningful set of
principles for our nation would be, in itself, invaluable.
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